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“[E]xpert witnesses . . . may now be called to express their opinion of the witness’ veracity.” 1 
The Honorable Jack B.Weinstein 
 




How can it be that two leading commentators take diametrically opposed positions 
concerning the use of expert testimony to address witness credibility?  While after the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Weinstein stated categorically that the Federal Rules 
permit experts to testify concerning a witness’s truthful character, Professor Michael Graham 
states with equal confidence that they do not.  Courts also adopt conflicting positions on the 
admissibility of expert testimony on witness credibility.  The Fifth Circuit has asserted that “[t]he 
readily apparent principle is that the jury should, within reason, be informed of all matters 
affecting a witness’s credibility to aid in their determination of the truth.”3 Other courts regard 
expert testimony relating to credibility as an invasion of the jury’s province, taking the view that 
“[c]redibility . . . is for the jury – the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.”4
The explanation for the conflicting lines of authority lies in the residual strength of the 
common law maxim that witnesses – particularly expert witnesses – must not invade the jury’s 
province by vouching for, or bolstering, a witness’s credibility.  It also lies in the extension of 
that maxim to preclude expert testimony that explains weaknesses in credibility.  Judge 
Weinstein looks at the Federal Rules of Evidence, which opened the door to more opinion 
testimony and more expert testimony, and concludes that the rules permit experts to testify 
concerning credibility.5 Professor Graham examines decisions and concludes that the testimony 
is not admissible.6 His assertion reflects the courts’ persistent adherence to the maxim, even 
though that limitation was not codified in the rules of evidence. 
The common law prohibition on expert testimony on credibility should not be given this 
residual effect and continue to restrict the admissibility of evidence bearing on credibility.  
Instead, the courts should set aside the maxim’s broadly stated prohibition and eliminate the 
overprotection of the jury’s “special province.”7 The courts should engage forthrightly the 
 
1 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 608[4] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1st 
ed. 1996).  Although Judge Weinstein’s treatise no longer contains such a firm assertion, it still acknowledges that 
experts may express an opinion concerning the witness's veracity:   
A possible benefit stemming from the allowance of opinion testimony is that the psychiatric expert will no longer 
have to adhere to the artificial rule of couching his or her opinion in terms of mental capacity; he or she may speak 
freely in terms of traits of character, to the extent that the concept is meaningful, without fear of running into the 
restrictions of the opinion rule. 
 Id. at § 608[28]. 
2 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 608.1, 130 n.3 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter GRAHAM,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE]. 
3 United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir. 1974). 
4 Unites States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir.1973). 
5 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 608.13 [3][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin 
ed., 2d  ed. 2006). 
6 See 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at § 704.1, 631-37 n.22. 
7 See Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the Professionalization of Fact-
Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1018-23 (2006) (discussing evolution of concept of jury’s special province and its 
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evidentiary issues raised by specific types of bolstering or impeaching expert testimony.  The 
rules of evidence do not support discontinued implementation of the prohibition on expert 
testimony addressing credibility.  Moreover, the courts cannot expect juries to function as 
accurate lie detectors; modern research has documented human weakness at divining credibility.  
There is no reason to think that jurors can effectively determine whether a witness is lying or 
telling the truth.  The legal system should respond to this insight by providing the jurors with as 
much assistance as possible, as they evaluate which witnesses to believe and which facts to 
credit.  Expert witnesses are sometimes able to supply this assistance. 
 An expert witness may provide insight concerning a specific witness based on expert 
evaluation of that witness, or may educate the jury on matters that the jury can bring to bear on 
its credibility assessment.  A particular expert’s testimony may address witness credibility in one 
of several ways.  How the courts should assess admissibility depends on the way in which the 
testimony addresses witness credibility.   
First, the expert may be in a position to testify concerning the witness’s general tendency 
to be truthful or untruthful – the witness’s character for truthfulness.  The notorious case, United 
States v. Hiss,8 involved exactly such testimony.  The trial court admitted the testimony of the 
defense expert that the government’s key witness, Whittaker Chambers, had a pathological 
condition that caused him to engage in persistent lying.9 Although the precedent established in 
Hiss has rarely been followed, the modern rules of evidence expressly provide that opinion 
concerning a witness’s character for truthfulness is admissible and carves out no special rule for 
expert opinion.10 Expert testimony addressing character for truthfulness should be admissible 
under the rules like that of lay character witnesses.   
Second, and far more commonly, expert testimony may address the witness’s perception 
and memory or the witness’s bias.  Testimony that bolsters or attacks credibility in these ways is 
not governed by a specific evidence rule; instead, it is governed by the general rules providing 
that relevant evidence is admissible but allowing the court to exclude relevant evidence if its 
negative characteristics substantially outweigh its probative value.  Evidence that helps the jury 
to understand the witness’s perception, memory, or bias has strong probative value.  Evidence 
falling in this category should generally be admitted. 
Third, an expert witness may help the jury understand the way in which a witness’s 
conduct reflects on the witness’s credibility.  When a witness’s conduct may suggest a lack of 
credibility to the jury, expert insight into that conduct may bolster the witness’s credibility.  Like 
evidence of perception, memory, or bias, testimony in this category is not governed by a specific 
rule of evidence and can play an important role in assisting the jury.   
 
application to expert testimony bearing on credibility and questioning validity of concept).  One commentator 
suggests that this notion of the “special province” is simply shorthand for the pre-rule reasons for excluding expert 
testimony.  See Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's Opinion 
About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 592, 617 (1989). 
8 88 F. Supp. 559 (D.C.N.Y. 1950). 
9 Id. at 559-60; see also Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers From the Hot Iron to the Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 
597, 626 (1995-1996) (discussing, albeit briefly, admission of expert’s testimony regarding Chamber’s veracity).  
The expert’s testimony is available at 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/hisstrialtranscripts.html#Dr.%20Carl%20A. 
10 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a).  Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 608(a) provides: 
 Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
Id. 
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Courts do not always recognize the different roles expert testimony can play, and, as a 
result, they apply evidentiary rules inappropriately or simply invoke the outdated maxim to bar 
expert testimony without full analysis.  The courts should engage in a more nuanced 
consideration of the role played by proffered expert testimony and how the role of the evidence 
affects its admissibility.  Doing so should lead the courts to embrace the promise of the modern 
rules of evidence and permit experts to assist juries as they assess credibility.11 This article 
explores the ways in which experts can help the jury, suggesting the analytical approaches the 
courts should apply depending on the nature of the expert testimony. 
In Section II, I provide a brief overview of the relevant rules of evidence to provide the 
context for the discussion.  In Section III, I describe the common law maxim and then 
demonstrate the flaws in its foundation as a rule in modern evidence law.  In Sections IV and V, 
I consider the different ways in which expert testimony can be used to help the jury assess 
credibility, arguing that the courts should admit such testimony far more readily.  In Sections VI 
and VII, I consider some of the barriers that have been used to continue the effect of the common 
law maxim and limit the admissibility of expert testimony bearing on credibility.  Finally, in 
Section VIII, I examine and caution against overreaching by the parties presenting expert 
testimony on credibility, suggesting that a more restrained approach will increase the willingness 
to allow such testimony. 
 
II. THE CONTEXT: A PRIMER ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The admissibility of expert testimony addressing credibility must be considered in the 
context of the modern rules of evidence as embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence.12 The 
federal rules marked a change in the law.  The rules establish a clear bias in favor of 
admissibility.13 In addition, the rules specifically abandon some common law restrictions on 
admissible evidence.14 Three sets of rules, each expanding the range of admissible evidence, 
bear on this discussion: the general rules governing the admissibility of relevant evidence, the 
rules governing character evidence, and the rules governing expert testimony.  Each of these sets 
of rules favors the admissibility of expert testimony addressing credibility. 
 
11 I disagree with the conclusion of Professor Friedland that a rules-based approach is not workable.  See Steven I. 
Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 209-10 
(1989).  His proposal for a system of limited admissibility would curtail expert testimony related to credibility too 
much and continue to deprive the jury of useful information.  See id. at 221-25. 
12 Since the federal rules went into effect in 1975, the majority of states have adopted rules of evidence modeled on 
the federal rules. 
13 See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 241 (7th ed.1998) (“The policy of the Rule is that if the balance between probative value and 
countervailing factors is close, the Judge should admit the evidence. In other words, there is a presumption in favor 
of admitting relevant evidence. . . . The rationale is that exclusion amounts to a total deprivation of the offeror’s 
probative evidence, while admission may be accompanied by redaction, limiting instruction, or other safeguard by 
which both the objector and offeror can ordinarily be accommodated.” (footnotes omitted) ); GLEN WEISSENBERGER 
& JAMES J. DUANE, WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.2, 87 (4th ed. 2001) (“It is clear that, at least 
symbolically, Rule 403 favors a presumption of admissibility by mandating that the negative attribute of the 
evidence must substantially outweigh its probative value before exclusion is justified.”); Berger, supra note 7, at 587 
(“The central objective of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to ensure that all available useful information reaches the 
trier of fact.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 
(1987) (discussing structure of federal rules and bias in favor of admissibility).   
14 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704 (abrogating prohibition on testimony as to ultimate issue). 
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First, the rules governing character evidence open the door to some evidence that would 
have been excluded at common law.  While the rules of evidence limit the admissibility of 
character evidence, they admit opinion evidence concerning truthful character.  Under Rule 
404(a), character evidence is generally inadmissible to establish that the person acted in 
conformity with character.  However, Rule 404(a)(3) creates an exception, admitting some 
character evidence relevant to credibility.15 One aspect of that exception is codified in Rule 
608(a) and is central to the discussion that follows.16 Rule 608(a) allows the introduction of 
evidence of a witness’s untruthful character to raise the inference that, acting in conformity with 
her untruthful character, the witness did not tell the truth at trial.  In response, the party seeking 
to bolster the witness’s credibility can introduce evidence of truthful character to raise the 
inference that the witness testified truthfully.  This rule codifies the common law rule that 
allowed evidence of a witness’s truthful or untruthful character, but it expands the range of 
admissible testimony.  Where the common law permitted character to be proved only through 
evidence of reputation, the modern rule admits opinion evidence as well.17 With this expansion, 
the rule thus opens the door to expert opinion concerning a witness’s character for truthfulness.18 
Second, the rules favor admissibility of relevant evidence, a proposition that logically 
extends to expert testimony concerning credibility.  The Federal Rules of Evidence contain no 
general rule addressing evidence that attacks or bolsters credibility.19 Instead, most 
impeachment questions are governed by the general rules of admissibility, Rules 402 and 403.20 
These rules establish a preference for admitting relevant evidence.  Rule 402 provides, in part, 
that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided.” 21 Rule 403 gives the 
 
15 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) provides that evidence of the character of a witness is admissible as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609. See McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Under FED. R. EVID.
404(a)(3) and 608(a), evidence of [witness’s] character for truthfulness was admissible after [attack].”); United 
States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 84 n.8 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that Rule 608 acts as exception to general exclusion of 
character evidence); United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that Rule 404(a)(3) 
creates exception to Rule 404, allowing character evidence pursuant to Rule 608(a)); KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 281 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (“Thus, Federal Rule and Revised Uniform 
Evidence Rule 404(a), which basically codify common law doctrine, provide that subject to enumerated exceptions, 
‘[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . .”); 1 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 353 (“Rule 404(a)(3) 
refers to the exception for evidence of the character of a witness as effecting [sic] the witness’ credibility provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609”.).   
16 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (allowing admission of character evidence concerning truthfulness).  For the text of Rule 
608(a), see supra note 10; Fred Warren Bennett, Is the Witness Believable?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 569 (1997).  The 
other aspects of the Rule 404(a)(3) exception are codified in Rule 608(b) (allowing cross examination on specific 
conduct reflecting untruthful character) and Rule 609 (allowing impeachment with prior convictions as proof of 
untruthful character). 
17 See also FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (allowing opinion as well as reputation evidence to prove character). 
18 The specific limitations of Rule 608 are discussed in Section IV.B infra.
19 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes: A Brief Reflection on the Question of 
Whether it is Necessary or Even Desirable to Fill the Seeming Gaps in Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Governing the Admissibility of Evidence Logically Relevant to the Witness Credibility, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 
1026 (1998).   Some state rules address impeachment generally.  See, e.g., PA. R. EVID. Rule 607(b) (“The 
credibility of a witness may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue, except as otherwise provided by 
statute or these Rules.”). 
20 See Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes, supra note 19, at 1026.  
21 FED. R. EVID. 402;  see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“The 
Rule's basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.”); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1984); David S. 
Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, 
and Rhetorical -- and Not Just the Methodical -- Aspects of  Science, 45 B.C.L. REV. 1, 41 (2003) (“Rule 402 sets 
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court discretion to exclude otherwise admissible relevant evidence due to its likely negative 
impact on the jury or on the administration of the trial, but only if the risk of negative impact 
substantially outweighs its probative value.22 Thus, unless expert testimony relevant to impeach 
or bolster credibility is excluded by a specific rule, the court should admit it unless its negatives 
substantially outweigh its tendency to impeach or bolster. 
Third, aspects of the rules governing expert testimony also favor admission of expert 
testimony bearing on credibility.23 In particular, Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
provides, that “testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”24 In the 
comments accompanying Rule 704, the Advisory Committee emphasized the importance of 
using expert testimony to help the jury and rejected the notion that an expert would usurp the 
province of the jury as “empty rhetoric.”25 In addition, the rules liberalized admissibility, 
abandoning the common law rule that admitted expert testimony only when it was necessary to 
the jury’s deliberations and allowing expert testimony whenever it would assist the jury.26 
forth a liberal admissibility standard for ‘[a]ll relevant evidence,’ defined in Rule 401 as ‘evidence having any 
tendency’ to make ‘more probable or less probable’ the existence ‘of any fact . . . of consequence’”); Imwinkelried, 
The Silence Speaks Volumes, supra note 19, at 1026. 
22 See FED. R. EVID. 403.  Rule 403 provides, in full: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Id. 
23 A full consideration of the impact of the rules governing expert testimony on the admissibility of expert testimony 
addressing credibility is beyond the scope of this article.  Under prevailing federal law, the trial court must evaluate 
the reliability of the expert’s opinion.  Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
 FED. R. EVID. 702.  Some expert testimony addressed to credibility will not be able to clear this hurdle.  See 
generally Berger, supra note 7, at 606 (referencing “helpfulness” standard of Rule 702); Friedland, supra note 11, at 
189-90 (discussing admissibility of evidence under guidelines of Rule 702).  
24 FED. R. EVID. 704.  The full text of the rule is as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is 
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may 
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 
fact alone. 
Id. 
25 FED. R. EVID. 704, advisory committee’s notes (quoting 7 WIGMORE §§ 1920-21); see also FED. R. EVID. 702, 
advisory committee’s notes.  The fundamental question that a court must answer . . . is “‘whether the untrained 
layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best degree, the particular issue without 
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject matter involved.’”  Id. United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that expert testimony would usurp jury’s 
function); Berger, supra note 7, at 593-604 (discussing this requirement as applied to testimony touching on 
credibility).  See generally Simmons, supra note 7, at 1023-25 (discussing origins of ultimate issue rule and impact 
of Rule 704). 
26 See United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 969 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding necessity is not condition precedent for 
admissibility of expert opinion testimony; rather, test is whether the opinion will assist trier of fact); Breidor v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Helpfulness is the touchstone of Rule 702.”); State v. 
Gherasim, 985 P.2d 1267, 1272 (Or. 1999) (holding evidence need only be helpful to be admitted and that the trial 
Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?  
8
Further, the rules permit experts to base their opinion on a wider range of information than the 
common law allowed.27 
In combination, these three aspects of the modern rules of evidence should smooth the 
path to the introduction of expert testimony bearing on credibility.  Still, courts resist.  They 
continue to rely on the common law maxim precluding such evidence, they overlook the fair 
probative value of testimony addressed to credibility, and they create barriers to the admissibility 
of such expert testimony.  The courts instead should take the invitation of the rules of evidence 
and open the door to expert testimony on questions of credibility. 
III. DEBUNKING THE MAXIM RESTRICTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ADDRESSING 
CREDIBILITY 
The prohibition on expert testimony addressing credibility finds its roots in the common 
law maxim that the expert must not invade the jury’s province of determining witness credibility.  
 
court had applied too demanding a standard); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Or. 1982) (detailing “assist 
the jury” standard); PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 702 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing common 
law understanding of expert testimony.).    
The common law viewed expert testimony with a somewhat jaundiced eye. Although ‘progressive’ courts began to 
liberalize the standards, in its purest form the common law was quite restrictive on a number of levels. (a) It 
confined experts to those with extensive formal learning. (b) They were allowed to testify only in areas totally 
beyond lay ken. (c) They had to base their testimony only on admissible, admitted evidence, (d) presented to them in 
an open court ‘hypothetical question’ that had to (e) stick scrupulously to proven facts, (f) and had to include 
substantially all the pertinent facts. (g) Neither experts nor lay witnesses could testify to an ultimate issue in the 
case, and (h) expert conclusions had to be based "on a reasonable degree of professional probability or certainty, not 
just possibility. 
Id.; 29 CHARLES A. WRIGHT  & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6265 (2006) (“Expert 
testimony was admissible under pre-rules common law only where the subject of that testimony was beyond the 
experience or knowledge of ordinarily lay people and would provide ‘appreciable help’ to the trier of fact.”); Berger, 
supra note 7, at 593-95; Deon J. Nossel, Comment, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law 
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 234 (1993).  A trial court’s assessment that expert 
testimony is unhelpful may be reversed as an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., State v. White, 943 P.2d 544, 547 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1997).  
27 See FED. R. EVID. 703. Rule 703 provides, in part: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. 
Id.; Daniel D. Blinka, “Practical inconvenience” or Conceptual Confusion: The Common-Law Genesis of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 703, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467 (1997) (reasoning that adoption of Rule 703 was important not 
only because it continued common-law traditions, “but also because the Federal Rules of Evidence greatly expanded 
the boundaries of admissibility . . . .”); see also FED. R. EVID. 705 (allowing expert to testify without first disclosing 
basis of opinion). 
Questions may arise concerning the expert’s access to information related to the opposing party’s witness.  
To realize the promise of Rule 608 and to maximize the utility of the other types of expert testimony that can help 
jurors more accurately assess credibility, experts will require access to information related to the witnesses about 
whom they are asked testify.  As a result, the courts may be asked to provide the opposing party’s expert access to 
information to assess character with an eye to attacking the witness’ credibility.  In some cases, the expert will need 
to examine the witness whose credibility is questioned.  See, e.g., Abbott v. State, 138 P.3d 462 (Nev. 2006) 
(discussing test governing whether to grant defendant's request for psychological examination of prosecution 
witness); People v. Acklin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (discussing prosecution disclosure to 
defense concerning complaining witness); Crawford, 718 A.2d 768, 769 (Pa. 1998) (alluding to defendant’s request 
and court’s order to have prosecution witness submit to psychological evaluation).  Consideration of this question is 
beyond the scope of the article. 
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That maxim rests on the premise that the jury is adequately equipped to assess a witness’s 
credibility and that expert testimony addressing credibility is both unnecessary and unduly 
invasion of the jury’s province.  This maxim, resting on this premise, is invoked in modern cases 
to limit the use of expert testimony to help the jury assess credibility. 
There are two flaws in this legal framework.  First, as discussed in Section B, the premise 
that the jury can effectively assess credibility is false.  Second, as discussed in Section C, the 
maxim is applied far more broadly than its roots warrant.  As I suggest in the later sections of the 
article, the courts should move away from this common law maxim and instead apply the 
modern rules of evidence to allow expert testimony that will assist the jury accurately to assess 
witness credibility. 
 
A. The Maxim 
 
Many courts cling tenaciously to the maxim that witnesses must not invade the jury’s 
province by vouching for or bolstering a witness’s credibility.28 In Commonwealth v. Seese, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained: 
The question of whether a particular witness is testifying in a truthful manner is one that must be 
answered in reliance upon inferences drawn from the ordinary experiences of life and common 
knowledge as to the natural tendencies of human nature, as well as upon observations of the 
demeanor and character of the witness.  The phenomenon of lying, and situations in which 
prevarications might be expected to occur, have traditionally been regarded as within the 
ordinary facility of jurors to assess.  For this reason, the question of a witness’s credibility has 
routinely been regarded as a decision reserved exclusively for the jury.29 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Except in the most unusual circumstances . . 
. credibility determinations are for the jury . . . .”); United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 663 (2d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490, 494 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating “[w]e have held that expert testimony cannot be 
offered to buttress credibility” to explain why defendant could not introduce expert testimony that would support her 
claim that based on international law she reasonably believed the computer she destroyed was not property); United 
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Credibility . . . is for the jury – the jury is the lie detector in 
the courtroom.”); Price v. State, 469 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting series of cases for proposition 
that “[i]n no circumstance may a witness’ credibility be bolstered by the opinion of another, even an expert, as to 
whether the witness is telling the truth”); Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (Va. 2002) (“An expert 
may not express an opinion as to the veracity of a witness because such testimony improperly invades the province 
of the jury to determine the reliability of a witness.”); People v. Williams, 773 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. App. 2002) 
(stating that “expert testimony should not be used to give an opinion as to the credibility of a witness at trial”); State 
v. Neswood, 51 P.2d 1159, 1164 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (acknowledging basis for defendant’s argument that expert 
improperly invaded province of jury to determine credibility); Price v. State, 469 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1996) (quoting series of cases for proposition that “[i]n no circumstance may a witness’ credibility be bolstered by 
the opinion of another, even an expert, as to whether the witness is telling the truth”);;2002) (acknowledging basis 
for defendant’s argument that expert improperly invaded province of jury to determine credibility); Commonwealth 
v. Loner, 609 A.2d 1376, 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205, 208 (Va. 2002) 
(“An expert may not express an opinion as to the veracity of a witness because such testimony improperly invades 
the province of the jury to determine the reliability of a witness.”); see also Simmons, , supra note 7 (discussing 
origins and application of the prohibition on invading province of jury); Walter R. Lancaster & Mark A. Dombroff, 
Expert Witnesses in Civil Trials (2d ed. 2005), available at Westlaw, EXPWIT-CIV § 9:21; Friedland, supra note 
11, at 168 (noting that most proffered expert testimony is rejected as counter to the jury’s special province to 
evaluate credibility). The district court for the District of Columbia invoked this maxim in rejecting I. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby’s proffered expert testimony on memory.  See United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 7 (D.D.C. 
2006) (citing Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2005)).   
29 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). 
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The courts invoke the maxim aggressively when expert testimony touches on witness 
credibility.30 The courts fear that the jury will abdicate its responsibility to assess credibility and 
defer to the expert’s opinion.31 
However, in considering the parameters of permissible expert testimony, the courts 
invoke the maxim too broadly and sometimes fail to distinguish between expert testimony that is 
helpful to the jury and expert testimony that simply endorses the testimony of the witness.  Thus, 
the maxim casts too wide a net, and is often invoked to exclude evidence that should be 
admitted.  Most significantly, it keeps the courts from focusing on the appropriate questions 
about the expert testimony – whether they satisfy the requirements of the rules governing expert 
testimony. 
 
30 See United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[e]xpert medical testimony 
concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is generally inadmissible because it invades the jury’s 
province to make credibility determinations”); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Credibility is  not a proper subject of expert testimony; the jury does not need an expert to tell it whom to believe, 
and the expert’s ‘stamp of approval’ on a particular witness’ testimony may unduly influence the jury.”); United 
States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135,142 (2d Cir. 1988) (expert witnesses may not opine as to the credibility of another 
witness’s testimony - this is a determination left solely to the jury); United States v. Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d 
Cir. 1948) (“[I]t is nevertheless axiomatic that the 'expert' may not go so far as to usurp the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and determine credibility.”); see also Berger, supra note 7, at 565 n. 23 (noting that 
appellate court permitted defense to appeal based on error on cross and stating that “[t]he majority apparently 
believes that not only must there be a per se rule excluding all expert testimony opinion about the credibility of 
another witness, but also that any error in this regard would justify a reversal regardless of who provoked the error”).  
31 See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001) (excluding testimony on grounds that “aura of 
reliability that’s attached to an expert witness . . . is significant”); United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 663 (2d Cir. 
1992) (explaining that expert testimony “strongly suggests” expert is to be believed); Patterson v. State, 628 S.E.2d 
618, 621 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (expressing concern that expert testimony concerning witness’ credibility would be 
“particularly compelling” to the jury); State v. Bailey, 87 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Mont. 2004) (“Expert testimony offered 
to bolster the credibility of a party and his or her claims is improper because it invades the province of the jury by 
placing a stamp of scientific legitimacy on a victim's allegations, or by dismissing the validity of the allegations.”); 
Seese, 517 A.2d at 922; Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (Nev. 1987) (“[I]t is essential to recognize that expert 
testimony, by its very nature, often tends to confirm or refute the truthfulness of another witness . . . .”); see also 
Berger, supra note 7; Simmons, supra note 7 (arguing that courts should abandon the maxim). 
Courts exaggerate the likelihood that jurors will defer to expert opinion.  See Simmons, supra note 7, at 
1053-54 (discussing studies demonstrating that jurors are not overly deferential to expert opinion).  Doing so, they 
sometimes treat improper vouching as serious error.  In Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1960), the 
court noted that the courts do view the harm inflicted by improper bolstering evidence introduced to support a 
prosecution witness as more serious than “the mere needless burdening of the proceedings or the distracting 
injection of collateral issues.  They recognize that such testimony is capable at times of so bolstering a witness’ 
testimony as artificially to increase its probative strength with the jury”  making it reversible error.  279 F.2d at 772.  
In Homan, the court noted that the federal courts are less inclined to reverse on this basis and concluded that the 
error was harmless.  But see Maurer v. Dep’t. of Corr., 32 F.3d 1286, 1289-91 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
improper vouching testimony rendered state court criminal trial fundamentally unfair and ordering trial court to 
grant petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus).  In Maurer, the prosecution asked each of its four witnesses whether the 
complainant “seemed sincere” when she told them of the alleged rape.  32 F.3d at 1288-89.  The state courts held 
that this testimony should not have been admitted but did not grant relief on that ground.  See id. at 1289.  The 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the challenged testimony “invaded the jury’s credibility determination to such an 
extent that it denied [the defendant due process of law].”  Id. at 1289 (quoting from the court’s statement of the 
federal issue which it resolved in the defendant’s favor).  But see McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445, 454 (8th Cir. 
1991) (finding no due process violation where witnesses at most “inferentially placed their ‘stamp of believability’” 
on witness); Adesiji v. Minnesota, 854 F.2d 299, 300-01 (8th Cir. 1988) (expert’s testimony that children rarely 
make up false accusations of sexual abuse did not prevent jury from weighing evidence fairly and deny due process 
where expert had not interviewed the witness in case). 
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B. Based on a False Premise 
Jurors cannot be expected to serve as accurate lie detectors.  There is now ample 
psychological literature demonstrating that humans in general and jurors specifically have 
limited ability to detect lying.32 In part, this limited lie-detection capability is due to our cultural 
reliance on analyzing physical cues when determining truthfulness – cues which social science 
research has shown are often not indicative of lying.33 
Therefore, rather than reflexively restricting evidence that addresses questions of 
credibility, the courts should focus on how to help the jury assess credibility.34 Rather than 
invoking the maxim that credibility is the jury’s special province, the courts should welcome 
expert testimony that helps the jury determine whether a particular witness is being truthful and 
whether a particular account of the facts is accurate.  The courts should take advantage of the 
latitude of the modern rules of evidence to facilitate, rather than bar, consideration of evidence 
that may shed light on a witness’s credibility.  
 
C. Applied Too Broadly  
 
Like many maxims, this one is given undue scope.  Courts cite the maxim when 
excluding expert testimony addressing a range of issues related to witness credibility.35 The 
 
32 See Berger, supra note 7, at 600-01 (citing cases allowing specialized expert testimony in areas jurors probably 
lacked knowledge or understanding); Friedland, supra note 11, at 167 and 178-87 (summarizing literature); Jeremy 
A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness 
Credibility, 72 NEB. L REV. 1157, 1189-1192 (1993) (providing introduction to differences between legal system’s 
reliance on jury’s ability to lie-detect and research finding the contrary);  Glenn Littlepage & Tony Pineault, Verbal, 
Facial and Paralinguistic Cues to the Detection of Truth and Lying, 4 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 
(1978) (conducting study concerning lie detection and found that “facial information is not effectively used as an 
important cue to the perception of truth”); Michael W. Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on 
Credibility, 43 ME. L. REV. 53, 64-64 (1991); Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and 
the Jury, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1990-91). The limitation on the ability to assess credibility accurately is 
exacerbated when jurors are asked to make cross-cultural determinations of truthfulness; cultural norms often cause 
jurors to read indicators improperly.  See Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury,
33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (“[J]urors of one race, even those well-intended and free of racial animus, will be 
unable to dependably judge the demeanor of a witness of a different race because they are unable to accurately 
decipher the cues that the witness uses to communicate sincerity.”).  
33 See Rand, supra note 32,at 3 (“[M]ost observers in controlled studies detect deception about as well as a flipped 
coin, because they focus on ‘cues’ to deception derived from folklore and common sense-such as the speaker's 
inability to maintain a steady gaze-that are often more a sign of discomfort than deception. Meanwhile, the savvy 
liar, familiar with that same folklore, successfully suppresses those cues to fool the detector.”) 
34 See Friedland, supra note 11, at 188 (noting that many courts have not abandoned “the common-sense approach to 
credibility” that has been challenged by social science research). 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding expert testimony concerning eyewitness 
identification threatened jury’s function); United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 664 (2d Cir. 1992) (reasoning that 
introduction of expert police testimony regarding drug dealing patterns was reversible error); United States v. Cecil, 
836 F.2d 1431, 1436 (4th Cir. 1988) (excluding psychiatrist report alleging that government's witness suffered from 
narcissistic personality disorder precluding witness from testifying truthfully); United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 
907 (9th Cir. 1973) (excluding expert psychiatric testimony concerning defendants discharge from military and 
ability to testify truthfully); State v. Tucker, 798 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding trial court erred in 
admitting expert testimony concerning characteristics of child molesters); State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d  804, 812 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1993) ("We hold that in a prosecution for sexual assault of a child, an expert witness may not give 
testimony which directly or indirectly expresses an opinion that the child is believable, that the child is credible, or 
that the witness' account has been validated."); State v. Fairweather, 863 P.2d 1077, 1081 (N.M. 1993) ("[T]he 
expert may not testify that the victim's PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] symptoms were in fact caused by 
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maxim acts sometimes as a barrier to evidence that should be admitted and sometimes as a 
surrogate for other specific evidence problems.   
 The maxim has a questionable pedigree, yet it is invoked and applied as a broad principle 
restricting admissible expert testimony.36 To illustrate the way in which the common law maxim 
is perpetuated and given undue scope, it is helpful to examine the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in United States v. Rivera.37 Both the precedent on which the court relied in Rivera and 
its impact outside the Ninth Circuit demonstrate the problem with the maxim.  In his treatise on 
federal evidence, Professor Graham cites Rivera to support the assertion that “Rule 704(a) of 
course permits neither a lay nor expert witness . . . to testify as to whether another witness is 
telling the truth.”38 In Rivera, the court actually held that the trial court did not commit plain 
error by admitting the testimony of a prosecution expert where the defendant had failed to object 
on grounds of bolstering and had also opened the door to the testimony on cross-examination.39 
Nevertheless, in discussing the testimony, the court asserted that expert testimony “may not 
appropriately be used to buttress credibility”40 and that an expert “is not permitted to testify 
specifically to a witness’ credibility or to testify in such a manner as to improperly buttress a 
witness’ credibility.”41 
In Rivera, the court supported its assertions by citing United States v. Brodie42 and United 
States v. Candoli.43 Neither opinion supports the broad assertions of Rivera. In Brodie, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the defendant’s expert in accounting, who would have 
testified that the defendants’ tax liability for the years in which they failed to file tax returns was 
little or nothing.44 Because the only relevant inference was that the taxpayers believed they 
owed no taxes, the court concluded that the testimony was precluded under Rule 704(b)45 as an 
opinion that the defendants did not have the requisite mental state.  The court went on to discuss 
“a further reason” for excluding the opinion – namely that it represented improper bolstering.46 
The court cited United States v. Binder47 for the proposition that expert testimony “may not 
appropriately be used to buttress credibility,”48 and both Binder and United States v. Brown49 for 
 
sexual abuse.").  See also Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 495 (6th Cir. 1999) (Merritt, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he testimony regarding the credibility of the eyewitness testimony was improper."); 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir.1996) (holding expert scientific testimony 
concerning truthfulness or credibility of witness is inadmissible because it invades jury's province in determining 
credibility); United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F.Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (“[I]t is hornbook law that the 
credibility of a witness and the weight to be given his testimony rests exclusively with the jury.”); United States v. 
Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1948) (“[A]n expert may not go so far as to usurp the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and determine credibility.”).  See also Berger, supra note 7, at 582 (noting that Second 
Circuit invoked principle based on very limited authority). 
37 43 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1995).  
38 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 704.1, 631. 
39 Rivera, 43 F.3d at 1295. 
40 Rivera, 43 F.3d at 1295 (citing United States v. Brodie, 858 F.2d 492, 496 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
41 Rivera 43 F.3d at 1295 (citing United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 506 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
42 858 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988). 
43 870 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.1989). 
44 See Candoli, 858 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988).  
45 FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in 
a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or 
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for 
the trier of fact alone”). 
46 Brodie, 858 F.2d at 496.  
47 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985) 
48 Brodie, 858 F.2d at 496 (citing Binder, 769 F.2d at 601). 
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the proposition that expert testimony “is properly excluded when it merely assesses the 
credibility of a taxpayer.”50 In Brown, a Tenth Circuit case tried before the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court affirmed the exclusion of the defendant’s expert on 
eyewitness identification.51 The court simply concluded that the subject was one of common 
knowledge, so the proffered testimony would have invaded the province of the jury.  The court 
did not consider whether the Federal Rules of Evidence had altered the evaluation of the question 
and cited only pre-rule authority.52 In Binder, the court considered expert testimony that the 
child victims could “distinguish reality from fantasy and truth from falsehood” and held that the 
testimony “improperly buttressed” the witnesses’ credibility, citing Barnard, another case 
decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect, and United States v. Awkard.53 In 
Awkard, the court held that the expert testimony constituted improper bolstering before an attack 
on credibility – a timing problem – and also cited Barnard for the broader proposition that 
credibility is for the jury, “the lie detector in the courtroom.”54 In Awkard, the court went on to 
assert that “[u]nder the Federal Rules, opinion testimony on credibility is limited to character; all 
other opinions on credibility are for the jurors themselves to form.”55 The court cited no rule or 
other authority to support this claim.56 
In Candoli, the other case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Rivera, the trial court permitted an 
expert to testify that another witness – the prosecution’s arson expert – had an excellent 
reputation as an expert.  The Ninth Circuit held the testimony was improperly admitted.57 The 
court correctly concluded that Rule 608(a) governed and held that the testimony could extend 
only to reputation for truthfulness and that the bolstering evidence could not be admitted unless 
the expert’s character for truthfulness had first been attacked.58 The court, citing Binder, went on 
include the broad assertion that “[a]n expert witness is not permitted to testify specifically to a 
witness’ credibility or to testify in such a manner as to improperly buttress a witness’ 
credibility.”59 
Thus, the assertion in Rivera traces its legal pedigree to pre-rule cases setting out 
common law principles and an un-examined and unsupported assertion about the effect of the 
federal rules.  By citing pre-rule authority and overstating the significance of the authority cited, 
the courts have given the maxim that expert testimony cannot address credibility undue impact.  
Instead, each court should evaluate with care the role played in the case by the particular expert 
 
49 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir.1976). 
50 Brodie, 858 F.2d at 496 (citing Binder, 769 F.2d at 602, and United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th 
Cir. 1976)).  
51 Brown, 540 F.2d at 1054.  
52 Brown, 540 F.2d at 1054. The FRE went into effect July 1, 1975.  In Brown, the offense date was July 1975 and 
the appeal was submitted July 1976 when little interpretation of the rules had occurred. 
53 See Binder, 769 F.2d at 602 (citing United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir.1973), and United 
States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1979)). The majority noted that the experts did not merely explain the 
psychological literature nor discuss a class of victims but instead testified that the children in the case “could be 
believed.”  Judge Wallace wrote separately and took issue with the characterization of the testimony, noting that the 
experts “testified only that the children were capable of telling the truth-they did not opine as to whether or not the 
children actually had done so.” Id. at 605 (emphasis in original). 
54 Awkard, 597 F.2d at 671. 
55 Awkard, 597 F.2d at 671.  In Awkard, the court also held that the expert had crossed the line into improper 
bolstering by testifying that the witness’ “memory had been accurately refreshed by hypnosis.” Id. at 670. 
56 Awkard, 597 F.2d at 671.  
57 United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496 (9th Cir.1989). 
58 Candoli, 870 F.2d at 506.  
59 Candoli, 870 F.2d at 506 (citing Binder, 769 F.2d at 602).  
Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?  
14
testimony offered.  The court should apply the rules of evidence, recognizing that those rules did 
not incorporate the common law maxim and should not be restricted by that maxim. 
 
IV. USING EXPERTS TO ASSESS CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS – RULE 608(A)
Unlike the common law, the modern evidence codes admit opinion evidence concerning 
the truthful or untruthful character of a witness.  An expert may be able to gauge a person’s 
general tendency to truthfulness or untruthfulness.  By opening the door to opinion testimony, 
the rules create the opportunity to present an expert witness to opine on a witness’s propensity to 
be (un)truthful.  Despite this change in the law, the courts, influenced by the common law 
maxim, generally remain reluctant to admit expert opinion on (un)truthful character. 
Moreover, even if a court is willing to admit expert opinion on (un)truthful character, the 
testimony is subject to two limitations.  First, the testimony can address only (un)truthful 
character and not the witness’s conduct.  Second, expert opinion that the witness has a truthful 
character is not admissible until the witness’s credibility has been attacked.  These limitations 
restrict the utility of expert testimony admitted under Rule 608(a).  As discussed in Section V 
below, the jury will receive full benefit of expert testimony on credibility only if the courts 
recognize that much of the testimony does not speak to character but addresses credibility in 
other ways. 
 
A. The Promise 
 
The character evidence rules contemplate robust attacks on credibility as well as a 
possibly time-consuming response to those attacks.60 That framework is codified in Rule 608, 
which represents an exception to the general prohibition on using character evidence to prove 
action in conformity.  Under the rule, character witnesses may testify that the witness is 
untruthful or, conversely, truthful and can express this fact in the form of reputation testimony or 
opinion.61 The jury can infer from this character testimony that the witness, possessing the 
 
60 See 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.2, 133 n.2 (explaining that although admission of 
character evidence rests within the discretion of trial court, general practice is to admit numerous character 
witnesses); see, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing defendant to present seven 
character witnesses at first trial and six at the second); State v. Kalex, 789 A.2d 1286  (Me. 2002) (holding that trial 
court committed reversible error by excluding testimony of five defense witnesses prepared to testify that 
complaining witness had bad reputation for truthfulness). 
61 See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 583-85 (discussing development and purpose of rule).  When lay witnesses 
testify concerning a party’s character, courts permit them to testify concerning whether they would believe that party 
under oath.  See, e.g., United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that prosecutor was 
properly permitted to ask witness who expressed opinion of defendant’s truthfulness whether she would believe 
defendant under oath); United States v. Dotson, 799 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding that witness with 
sufficient basis to testify to opinion concerning character may be asked whether the person in question was to be 
believed under oath); United States v. Lollar, 606 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing role of Rule 608 and holding 
question proper); United States v. Bambulas, 471 F.2d 501, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1972) (detailing discussing divergence 
of authority on question but concluding that trial court may have committed error by precluding defense counsel 
from asking defendant’s character witnesses whether they would believe him under oath); Held v. United States, 260 
F. 932 (5th Cir. 1919); Ballard v. State, 767 So. 2d 1123, 1140 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Muse, 319 So. 2d 
920, 922 (La. 1975) (“The proper question to be put to a witness for the purpose of impeaching the general character 
of another witness . . . is whether he would believe him upon his oath.”); Pitts v. State, 74 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 1954) 
(holding that trial court properly allowed character witness to be asked on cross-examination whether he would 
believe the defendant under oath “where he personally was interested in the outcome of the case”).  In Ballard, the 
defendant called character witnesses who testified that she had a good character for honesty and truthfulness.  767 
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character trait described by the character witness – untruthfulness or truthfulness – is likely to 
behave consistently with that character trait and testify accordingly.62 Not only do the federal 
rules continue this use of character witnesses addressing truthfulness, but, by including opinion 
testimony, the rules appear to open the door to expert assessment of a witness’s general capacity 
for truthfulness. 
 The reason for admitting character evidence and permitting this exploration of a witness’s 
character for truthfulness is that credibility is a central concern in many trials.  As Judge 
Weinstein points out, “credibility is often the crucial issue in a case, and character evidence, 
despite its flaws ‘may still serve a purpose in calling to the jury’s attention to what might be an 
otherwise unknown deficiency of the witness and thus give the jury a more adequate basis for 
judging his testimony.’”63 Given the importance and difficulty of credibility determinations, the 
rules admit evidence of truthful or untruthful character to assist the jury in making these 
determinations.  
 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, they opened the door to opinion 
evidence as a way to prove character.  Rule 608(a) specifically allows the use of opinion 
evidence concerning (un)truthful character,64 and the majority of states that have enacted rules of 
evidence have adopted the same broad rule.65 Judge Weinstein succinctly stated the promise of 
 
So. 2d at 1140.  On direct, they also testified that they would believe the defendant’s testimony under oath. See id. 
The Alabama court held that the prosecution was properly allowed to ask on cross-examination whether the witness 
“would believe the defendant’s testimony in this courtroom under oath even if to do so you would have to disbelieve 
the testimony of four or five other witnesses who testified also under oath, including a police officer.” See id.; see 
also United States v. Walker, 313 F.2d 236, 239-41 (6th Cir. 1963) (discussing division of authority but concluding 
that majority position is to allow the question); 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.3, 139 (5th Ed. 
2001) (citing Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498, 534 (1939)) (allowing 
question);  Bennett, supra note 16, at 569 (1997) (“At common law, in criminal prosecutions, the accused was 
allowed to call witnesses to show that his character was such that it was unlikely that the defendant would be guilty 
of the charged crime.”).  
62 See 4 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 608.02[1]; see also United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244-45 
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that trial court erred in excluding two witnesses proffered to discredit government witness’s 
character); Cooper v. State, 628 So. 2d 1371, 1374 (Miss. 1993) (holding trial court committed error by precluding 
witness from testifying to his opinion that prosecution witness had untruthful character).   
63 4 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 608.02[1] (quoting Mason Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character 
Testimony, 24 IOWA L. REV. 498, 534 (1939)). 
64 See Bennett, supra note 16, at 569. 
65 See., e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 5.608(a) (West 2006); Md. CODE ANN., Evid. § 5-608 (West 2006); 4 NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 50.085 (West 2005); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2608 (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-9 
(2006); ALA. R. EVID. 608(a); ALASKA R. EVID. 608(a); ARIZ. R. EVID. 608(a); ARK. R. EVID. 608(a); COLO. R. 
EVID. 608(a); CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-6(a); DEL. R. EVID. 608(a); HAW. R. EVID. 608(a); IDAHO R. EVID. 608(a); 
IND. R. EVID. 608(a); KY. R. EVID. 608(a); MICH. R. EVID. 608(a); MINN. R. EVID. 608(a); MISS. R. EVID. 608(a); 
MONT. R. EVID. 608(a); N.H.R. EVID. 608(a); N.J.R. EVID. 608(a); N.M.R.A. 11-608(a); N.D.R. EVID. 608(a); OHIO 
R. EVID. 608(a); OR. R. EVID. 608(1); R.I.R. Evid. 608(a); S.C.R. EVID. 608(a); TENN. R. EVID. 608(a); TEX. R. 
EVID. 608(a); UTAH R. EVID. 608(a); VT. R. EVID. 608(a); W. VA. R. EVID. 608(a); WYO. R. EVID. 608(a).  Some 
states expressly preclude use of expert testimony to help the jury understand character as a predictor of conduct.  See 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.609 (prohibiting use of opinion testimony); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608(a) (2006) 
(prohibiting use of opinion testimony); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-405 (2005) (limiting admissibility of expert opinion 
under NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608(a) (2005) to non-scientific grounds); ME. R. EVID. 608(a) (prohibiting use of 
opinion testimony); N.C.R. EVID. 405(a) (proscribing expert testimony under Rule 608(a)); PA. R. EVID. 608(a) 
(prohibiting use of opinion testimony); WASH. R. EVID. 608(a) (prohibiting use of opinion testimony). North 
Carolina, for example, addresses the question in Rule 405(a) of the Rules of Evidence.  The North Carolina rule 
limits proof of character by adding the following sentence to the language of the Federal Rule 405(a): Expert 
testimony on character or a trait of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior.  Both 
impeachment and bolstering under Rule 608 operate by informing the jurors that the witness is untruthful or truthful 
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this expanded rule of admissibility, asserting that “expert witnesses . . . may now be called to 
express their opinion of the witness’ veracity.”66 
Given the special insight an expert may have into whether a witness has a tendency to be 
untruthful or truthful, this testimony offers to be extremely helpful to the jury.67 Certain 
conditions are associated with an untruthful nature or character.68 An expert may be able to 
provide an informed opinion that a witness suffers from a mental condition that impairs the 
ability to provide truthful testimony. 69 Like any other witness testifying pursuant to the 
invitation of Rule 608(a), an expert expressing an opinion that the witness is not a truthful person 
is doing so to persuade the jury not to believe the witness.  In the case of the expert, the 
persuasion lies in the specialized insight expressed in the opinion.  Thus, expert testimony 
addressing untruthful character falling within Rule 608(a) may have greater probative value than 
a lay assessment of the witness’s general character for untruthfulness. 
The First Circuit recognized this aspect of Rule 608(a) in United States v. Shay70. In 
Shay, the trial court refused to admit the defendant’s expert testimony that he suffered from 
pseudologia fantastica, a mental disorder characterized by self-aggrandizing lies.71 The 
testimony would have supported the defense contention that the defendant’s statements 
suggesting he was responsible for a fatal bombing were untrue.72 Both the trial court and the 
government took the view that the evidence “concerned a credibility question that was the jury’s 
 
and thereby inviting them to draw the inference that the witness, acting in conformity with character, is lying or 
telling the truth.  As a result, this limitation in Rule 405(a) precludes the use of expert testimony under Rule 608(a).  
See State v. Heath, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1986) (holding that admission of expert opinion regarding credibility 
was error); State v. Aguallo, 350 S.E.2d 76 (N.C. 1986) (excluding expert testimony). 
66 3 WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, supra note `, ¶ 608[4]. 
67 See State v. Tafoya, 617 P.2d 151, 153 (N.M. 1980) (acknowledging the admissibility of expert testimony under 
Rule 608(a)); see)).  See also Mullane, supra note 32, at 97.  
68 Disorders affecting veracity include conduct disorder, factitious disorder, and antisocial behavior disorder.  See 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (American Psychiatric Association, 4th ed., 2000).  
Those suffering from Conduct Disorder display:  
 a repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in which the basic rights of other or major age-appropriate societal 
norms or rules are violated. . . . Acts of deceitfulness or theft may include . . . frequently lying or breaking promises 
to obtain goods or favors or to avoid debts or obligations. . . .  They [those suffering from Conduct Disorder] may be 
callous and lack appropriate feelings of guilt or remorse.  It can be difficult to evaluate whether displayed remorse is 
genuine because some of these individuals learn that expressing guilt may reduce or prevent punishment. 
Did. at 93-94. Likewise, 
 [t]he essential feature of Factitious Disorder is the intentional production of physical or psychological signs or 
symptoms.  The presentation may include fabrication of subjective complaints (e.g. complaints of acute abdominal 
pain in the absence of such pain), falsification of objective signs (e.g. manipulating a thermometer to create the 
illusion of fever) . . . exaggeration or exacerbation of preexisting general medical conditions . . . . 
Id. at 513.  Finally, "[i]ndividuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder fail to conform to social norms with respect 
to lawful behavior. . . . They are frequently deceitful and manipulative in order to gain personal profit or pleasure 
(e.g. to obtain money, sex, or power).  They may repeatedly lie, use an alias, con others, or malinger."  See id. 
69 Of course the expert testimony must comport with Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; the expert must be 
qualified and must apply reliable expertise with an adequate basis.  See 3 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 
2 § 702:1 (explaining expert witness can be qualified on “basis of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education or a combination thereof”).  Graham goes on to explain that the trial court must also determine whether 
the evidence would “be helpful, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue.”  Id.; 4 WEINSTEIN’S
EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 702.02 [3]-[4] (discussing prerequisites to admissibility of expert opinion testimony). 
70 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995). 
71 See id. at 129-30. 
72 In this case, the testimony was offered under Rule 806 to impeach the credibility of the defendant’s own 
statements offered by the prosecution.  See Shay, 57 F.3d at 131-32; FED. R. EVID. 806. 
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exclusive province to resolve.”73 The First Circuit disagreed, acknowledged that Rule 608(a) 
“contemplates that truthful or untruthful character may be proved by expert testimony.”  While 
remarking that “an expert’s opinion that another witness is lying or telling the truth is ordinarily 
inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702,” the court held that the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence 
constituted error. 74 
Similarly in United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado,75 the First Circuit found error where 
the trial court did not allow the defendant’s expert to testify concerning the defendant’s poor 
character for truthfulness.  Like Shay, Gonzalez-Maldonado entailed a defense attack on the 
defendant’s credibility in order to reduce the weight of the defendant’s recorded statements 
introduced by the prosecution.  The defense expert would have testified that the defendant “had a 
medical condition that led him to exaggerate.”76 The evidence should have been admitted under 
Rule 608(a) to establish the defendant’s poor character for truthfulness and the consequent 
likelihood that he was lying in the conversations. 
Despite the promise of Rule 608(a), courts have been slow to admit expert opinion that 
falls squarely within the rule.77 Disregarding the explicit language of the rule, which permits 
opinion testimony to establish untruthful or truthful character, the courts remain committed to the 
proposition that expert testimony is “generally inadmissible because it invades the jury’s 
province to make credibility determinations.”78 In a number of cases, court have excluded 
evidence that appears to qualify as opinion evidence describing truthful or untruthful character 
warranting admission under Rule 608(a).  In United States v. Wertis, for example, the defendant 
offered expert testimony which the court described as having “a psychiatrist opine whether a 
principal prosecution witness ‘ . . . would . . . have a tendency to be reliable as a witness in 
distinguishing the truth from non-truth, realities from fantasies . . . .’”79 The Fifth Circuit held 
that the evidence was properly excluded, stating “[s]uch a question as that proffered is beyond 
the competence of any witness. Peeled of its thin veneer of jargon, it amounts to no more than an 
inquiry whether the witness is to be believed by the jury or not.”80 
Similarly, in Bastow v. General Motors Corp., a products liability decision, the Eighth 
Circuit held that the trial court had properly excluded the testimony of the defendant’s 
 
73 Shay, 57 F.3d at 126, 130-31. 
74 Shay, 57 F.3d at 131. The court pointed out that the advisory committee notes to Rule 405 expressly contemplate 
the use of expert opinion testimony to establish character traits when evidence of those traits is admissible. 
75 115 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
76 115 F.3d at 15.  The symptoms of the defendant’s condition included “`verbosity;’ ‘grandeza’ (‘[h]e has to feel 
important and the center of attention as part of his . . . fragmented ego needs’), and exaggeration.”  Id. at 15. 
77 See 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.1 at 130 n. 3, § 704. 1 at 31-32 n. 22 (asserting “[e]xpert 
opinion as to the character of a witness for truthfulness is not admissible” and citing cases refusing to admit expert 
opinion on truthful character) (emphasis in original). 
78 United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 
289 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n expert may not intrude on the jury's role in assessing credibility. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to exclude expert testimony offered to bolster the credibility of fact witnesses.”); United States v. Hall, 
165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Furthermore, we believe that the credibility of eyewitness testimony is 
generally not an appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function of the jury -- 
determining the credibility of witnesses.”); United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that experts may not usurp the function of the jury by discussing witness credibility); United States v. Falcon, 245 F. 
Supp. 2d, 1239, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“[A]bsent extreme or unusual circumstances, expert scientific testimony 
concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is inadmissible because it invades the jury's province in 
determining credibility.”); Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920 at 922 (“It is an encroachment upon the province 
of the jury to permit admission of expert testimony on the issue of a witness' credibility.”).  
79 505 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1975). 
80 Wertis, 505 F.2d at 685. 
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psychologist.81 The defendant argued that the proffered testimony that the plaintiff “had an 
antisocial behavior disorder and hence a character for untruthfulness” was admissible under Rule 
608(a) (1).82 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the evidence might cause the 
jurors “to surrender their own common sense” and could lead to a mini-trial on the plaintiff’s 
credibility – “a collateral but important matter.”83 The court did not address the clear invitation 
of Rule 608 to provide insight into witnesses’ character for truthfulness. 
Courts steeped in the maxim that witnesses – particularly expert witnesses – must not 
invade the jury’s province by vouching for or bolstering a witness’s credibility are 
understandably resistant to admitting such testimony.  This expert testimony speaks directly to 
the witness’s credibility and nothing else.  The expert testimony in these cases could have 
assisted the jury to assess credibility and was properly admissible under Rule 608(a).   
 
B. The Limitations 
 
The rules admitting character evidence to establish truthful or untruthful character exist 
against the backdrop of evidence rules that disfavor the admissibility of character evidence as a 
means for predicting behavior as well as of courts reluctant to allow expert assessment of 
credibility.  The law strongly prefers to judge the case, not the person and views the inference 
that someone acted in accord with character as relatively weak.  In addition, exploring questions 
of character at trial can be unduly distracting and may inject unfair prejudice.  As a result, the 
rules of evidence encourage the jury to determine the facts of the events and not dwell on the 
character of those involved.  For those reasons, character evidence is strictly limited as to 
admissibility and, when admissible, as to form.  Although Rule 608(a) allows a party to use 
character evidence to attack, and in response to bolster, a witness’s credibility, testimony 
admitted under Rule 608(a) is subject to two limitations.  First, when admissible under Rule 
608(a), expert testimony is circumscribed: it cannot stray into discussion of the witness’s 
conduct, but must remain within the parameters of character evidence,84 and can address only 
one character trait – truthfulness.85 Second, the rules prohibit bolstering with evidence of 
truthful character before the witness’s credibility has been attacked.86 
81 844 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1988). 
82 See Bastow, 844 F.2d at 510. 
83 Bastow, 844 F.2d at 511 (citing Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (10th Cir. 1973)).  The trial court and appellate court 
relied entirely on the maxim that credibility is for the jury, rather than on any assessment that the witness lacked 
expertise, had an inadequate basis for the proffered opinion or had misapplied expert principles. 
84 See 2 GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.2, 133 (“[S]pecific instances of conduct in support of the 
witness’ character for truthfulness remain inadmissible.”); see also United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1314 
(10th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that DUI history was inadmissible, in that it was barred by Rule 405 as specific instance 
of conduct); United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Reputation evidence of this kind is 
sometimes admissible, FED. R. EVID. 608(a), although its weight is usually quite limited--precisely because specific 
examples of untruthfulness cannot be elicited in support.”); United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he Rule [608(a)] prohibits rehabilitation by character evidence of truthfulness after direct attacks on a 
witness's veracity in the instant case. However, the Rule permits rehabilitation after indirect attacks on a witness's 
general character for truthfulness.”); Kitchens v. State, 898 P.2d 443, 450 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (“Under [Rule 
608], [the attorney] could properly ask [the witness] for his opinion of [another witness’s] general credibility, but 
[the attorney] was not entitled to elicit [the witness’s] opinion as to the credibility of any specific statement by 
[another witness].”); Galuser Storage, L.L.C v. Smedley, 27 P.3d 565, 571 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (“Opinion 
testimony concerning credibility must be limited to testimony addressing a witness's general reputation for 
truthfulness, leaving the resolution of credibility for the fact-finder.”). 
85 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(1) (“[E]vidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”); see also 
Renda v. King,  337 F.3d 550, 553-54 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[E]vidence of a witness's good character for truthfulness is 
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1. Character for truthfulness only
As referenced, Rule 608(a) severely circumscribes the evidence it admits.  Under the rule, 
the testimony may relate only to truthful character.87 It does not extend to the witness’s 
truthfulness on specific matters.88 Character witnesses can testify only whether, in their opinion 
or based on their knowledge of reputation, the other witness has a truthful or untruthful character 
and whether they would believe the witness under oath.  Thus, an expert testifying under Rule 
608(a) is limited to discussing conditions that bear on general truthfulness or untruthfulness.89 
While expert witnesses may identify some conditions that bear directly on a general propensity 
for (un)truthfulness, far more psychological conditions affect a witness’s perception and memory 
or behavior that may reflect on credibility.  Rule 608(a) does not accommodate expert testimony 
 
admissible under some circumstances to show that the witness is acting in conformity with that character for 
truthfulness when testifying in the particular case.”); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 901 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(reasoning that past sexual encounters were unrelated to truthfulness); United States v. Nazarenus, 983 F.2d 1480, 
1486 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that history of exceeding speed limit was unrelated to truthfulness); United States 
v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir. 1979) (allowing defendant to admit evidence of truthful character 
provided prosecution chooses to attack same); United States v. Med. Therapy Sciences, 583 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 
1978) (reasoning that character evidence only admissible when directed at witness’s character for truthfulness); 2 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.1, 131-32 (“Rule 608 relates solely to the introduction of opinion 
or reputation testimony and specific instances of conduct offered as probative of the witness’ character for 
truthfulness and untruthfulness.  Admissibility of specific acts of misconduct or opinion or reputation testimony 
offered for any other purpose lies outside the scope of Rule 608.”). Additionally, in those states that preclude the 
introduction of expert testimony under Rule 608, expert testimony is only admissible if it addresses a non-character 
issue. 
86 See FED. R. EVID. 608(a)(2) (“[E]vidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.”); see also United States v. Drury, 
396 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (11th 2005) (determining prosecutor’s questioning failed to attack defendant’s character for 
truthfulness); United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that cross-examination 
exposing witness’s “various illegal and sordid activities” constituted attack on truthfulness); United States v. Hilton, 
772 F.2d 783, 786 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[E]vidence of a witness’ [sic] truthful character is admissible only after 
character for truthfulness has been attacked.”).   
87 See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Under the Federal Rules, opinion testimony on 
credibility is limited to character; all other opinions on credibility are for the jurors themselves to form.”); Azure,
801 F.2d at 339-40 (concluding that expert’s testimony did not fall within Rule 608(a) because it was not limited to 
an opinion on the witness’ character for truthfulness but “addressed the specific believability and truthfulness of [the 
witness’ story]”).  See also FED. R. EVID. 608, advisory committee’s notes (“In accordance with the bulk of judicial 
authority, the inquiry is strictly limited to character for veracity, rather than allowing evidence as to character 
generally.”). 
88 See generally Maddox v. Cash Loans of Huntsville II, 21 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1338-40 (N.D.Ala.1998) (explaining 
distinction and discussing authority).  But see United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(expressing view that polygraph test supporting claim that witness is telling the truth as to specific matters would be 
admissible under Rule 609(a) if witness’ credibility were first attacked); United States v. Padilla, 908 F.Supp. 923, 
927-28 (S.D.Fla.1995) (accord). 
89 See Candoli, 870 F.2d at 506 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that court committed error by permitting witness to testify 
to excellent reputation as an expert because Rule 608(a) restricts testimony to reputation for truthfulness); United 
States v. Greer, 643 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Since counsel's question inquired of [the witness's] reputation in 
the community, rather than being limited to his reputation for truthfulness and veracity, it was improper under Rule 
608."); United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that expert testimony concerning 
whether witness's memory was restored with hypnosis was not limited to witness's character for truthfulness). Of 
course, an expert who knows a witness well enough to form an opinion of the witness’ truthful character or who is 
familiar with the witness’ reputation can testify in the same way as a lay witness under Rule 608(a). 
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reaching those subjects.  Expert testimony concerning perception, memory or conduct bears on 
credibility, but not specifically on truthful character. 
 
2. Timing: No bolstering before attack  
Under Rule 608, a party cannot bolster a witness’s credibility with evidence of good 
character for truthfulness until the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.90 
Therefore, to present bolstering character testimony, the party must persuade the court either that 
the witness’s credibility has been attacked, or that the offered testimony is not offered merely to 
establish truthful character and therefore does not fall within Rule 608.   
 
This general rule that evidence of good character for truthfulness cannot be introduced 
until the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked has its roots in the principle that 
“every witness in the law is assumed to be of normal moral character for veracity” so bolstering 
is not worthwhile until there has been an attack.91 There is also a concern that initiating an 
exploration of truthful character by introducing bolstering evidence will precipitate a time-
consuming exchange that may distract the jurors from the central issues of the case.92 In addition 
to avoiding waste of time and distraction of the jury, courts also worry that bolstering may 
“artificially increase” the probative strength of the witness’s testimony.93 
After a witness’s general character for truthfulness has been directly or indirectly 
attacked, evidence of good character for truthfulness is admissible.94 The mere suggestion that 
 
90 See United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining trial court did not abuse 
discretion by in disallowing bolstering testimony when witness credibility had not been attacked); United States v. 
Bonner, 302 F.3d 776,781 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining rehabilitative evidence is permissible only after attack on 
credibility has been made); United States v. Scott, 267 F.3d 729, 734-35 (7th Cir. 2001) (differentiating between 
bolstering evidence and evidence offered to rehabilitate attacked credibility); Candoli, 870 F.2d at 506 (holding 
court committed error by permitting one expert to testify that an expert who testified in the prosecution’s case-in-
chief had an excellent reputation as an expert, in part, because it represented bolstering before the witness’s 
character had been attacked).  
91 Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1960) (citing IV John Henry Wigmore, WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE, § 1104 (3d ed. 1940)). 
92 Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402, supra note 13, at 144; Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes,
supra note 19, at 1025. 
93 Homan, 279 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1960).  In the case before it, the Homan court concluded that the improper 
bolstering was harmless.  Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit later cited Homan as standing for the proposition that 
“[w]hen bolstering testimony suggests to the jury that it may shift to a witness the responsibility for determining the 
truth of the evidence, its admission may constitute reversible error.” United States v. Price, 722 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 
1983); see also Johnson v. State, 108 N.W. 55 (Wis. 1906).  In Johnson, the court explained: 
That rule is the logical result of the other one that the law presumes every person to be reputed truthful till evidence 
shall have been produced to the contrary and therefore, for one to take the initiative in establishing that which so 
needs no support, other than the legal presumption, is useless.   
Id. at 58. 
94 See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s note.  Opinion or reputation evidence of a witness's untruthfulness, as 
well as evidence of misconduct, constitute attacks on credibility sufficient to admit rehabilitative testimony.  See id;
see also Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that opening statement, by suggesting witness 
was corrupt police officer, constituted attack under Rule 608(a)(2)); United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that exposure, during cross-examination of witness’s long-standing and heavy drug use, 
acquaintance with drug dealers, convictions for drug possession, unlawful carrying of an unlicensed firearm and 
inconsistent statements to grand jury allowed for bolstering evidence directed at veracity); United States v. Dring, 
930 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The purpose of Rule 608(a)(2) is to encourage direct attacks on a witness's 
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the witness has not told or is not able to tell the truth in specific instances does not constitute a 
sufficient attack to open the door to bolstering.95 The clearest example of an attack is calling an 
anti-character witness under Rule 608 to testify that the other witness has a bad character for 
truthfulness.96 In addition, however, courts have held that certain avenues of cross-examination 
constitute attacks on character that open the door to bolstering.97 Consequently, the opposing 
party often holds the key to the admissibility of bolstering evidence that falls within Rule 608(a) 
and must open the door before it can be offered. 
 Rule 608(a) thus offers an avenue for introducing some expert testimony to assist the jury 
to assess witness credibility.  But it is severely circumscribed.  The expert can only speak to the 
witness’s general character for (un)truthfulness and evidence of truthfulness may not be 
introduced unless the opposing party attacks the witness’s character for truthfulness.  However, 
not all expert testimony that bolsters or impeaches credibility focuses on character for 
truthfulness and therefore falls within Rule 608.98 Moreover, while the rule allows opinion 
concerning character to be used in a way that is otherwise not permitted, it does not exclude the 
use of opinion for other purposes.99 
As the discussion that follows reflects, most admissible expert testimony bearing on 
credibility should be evaluated under other rules and admitted to give the jury insight into 
something other than the witness’s truthful character.  A court that mistakenly applies Rule 
608(a) to non-character expert testimony, however, will analyze the evidence incorrectly, not 
accounting for its actual role in the case, and may inappropriately restrict expert testimony 
addressing credibility.100 The distinction is particularly critical in jurisdictions that explicitly 
 
veracity in the instant case and to discourage peripheral attacks on a witness's general character for truthfulness.”); 
Bennett, supra note 16, at 590 (discussing what constitutes attack). 
95See FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes.  Evidence of bias does not allow for the admission of character 
evidence under Rule 608(a), as it focuses on a witness’s veracity in a particular case, rather than a predisposition for 
untruthfulness.  See Renda, 347 F.3d at 554; see also Dring, 930 F.2d at 691 (reasoning that bias evidence 
constitutes a direct attack on specific instances of untruthfulness).  Likewise, inconsistent statements or testimony 
also open the door for rehabilitative evidence.  See Renda, 347 F.3d at 554; United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 
1314 (“The mere fact that a witness is contradicted by other evidence in a case does not constitute an attack upon his 
reputation for truth and veracity”); United States v. Med. Therapy Sciences, Inc., 583 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1978).   
96 See, e.g., United States v. Herzberg, 558 F.2d 1219, 1224 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding testimony of bad reputation in 
community is appropriate impeaching testimony).   
97 See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding vigorous and extensive cross-
examination exposing witness’s illegal activities constitutes attack on character for veracity); United States v. 
Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1123 (8th Cir. 1977) (allowing bolstering evidence after cross-examination that included 
accusations of misconduct and bad character).  
98 Even when admitting such evidence, courts may be confused.  In State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000), the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the trial court properly permitted the prosecution expert to testify that the 
prosecution’s witness was too mentally limited to be susceptible to coaching.  Rather than recognizing the role of the 
evidence in explaining the witness’s memory and perception, the court treated the testimony as addressing truthful 
character and therefore admissible under Rule 608(a).  See Id. at 645-46.  The court set forth the colloquy from the 
trial, reporting that the expert testified that, given the witness’s inability to master simple educational tasks, such as 
spelling her own name or accurately recalling her own birth date, he did not see how she could be coached to give a 
consistent, false account of the facts.  See id. at 645.  The limitations that apply under Rule 608(a) did not come into 
play because the expert testimony responded to an attack on the witness on cross-examination, which raised the 
suggestion of fabrication and coaching.  See also State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193-94 (Minn. 1997) (holding 
expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome was admissible under Rule 608(a) rather than recognizing its 
role in explaining conduct, not character). 
99 See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 584-86. 
100 For example, courts have demonstrated confusion about the role of Rule 608 in evaluating polygraph evidence.  
Polygraph evidence speaks to a witness’s truthfulness or reactions to information in a specific case, not to general 
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preclude experts from testifying to opinions concerning truthful character.101 It is therefore 
crucial that courts (1) properly determine the role expert testimony plays in the assessment of 
credibility, and (2) evaluate its admissibility under the appropriate rules. 102 
V. PROPER IMPEACHMENT AND BOLSTERING NOT WITHIN RULE 608  
 
Truthfulness is only one of the jury’s concerns as it assesses the credibility of a witness’s 
testimony.  Even a truthful witness may not be worthy of belief in a particular case; and a 
witness who has a generally untruthful character may provide reliable information in a particular 
case.  The jury should not credit the testimony of a witness who tells the truth but suffers from 
impaired perception or memory.  The jury should scrutinize the testimony of a witness who may 
be influenced by bias or self-interest in the case.  In addition, the jury should also consider 
whether the witness’s conduct is consistent with their in-court testimony and whether there is 
factual corroboration of the witness’s testimony.  Rule 608 does not govern testimony that 
addresses credibility in these other ways.  
 Expert witnesses often offer insights that speak to these factors that bear on credibility 
without addressing truthful character.  Non-character expert testimony bearing on credibility falls 
into three categories of admissible evidence: evidence concerning perception, memory, or bias; 
evidence explaining behavior; and testimony that simply agrees with a witness’s testimony.  
Admissibility of this evidence is governed only by the general rules of admissibility – Rules 402 
and 403.  In each of these areas, the expert testimony has more probative force than the mere 
character inference that the witness is a liar and therefore is more likely to be lying in court.  
Evidence addressing perception, memory, bias, conduct, or the substantive issues in the case 
speaks pointedly to the credibility of the testimony in the case and has extremely strong 
probative value.  Consequently, expert testimony falling into these categories should be more 
readily admitted at trial.  Nevertheless, the effect of the common law maxim is apparent in these 
areas and, as a result, judicial resistance to this testimony endures.103 
The following three sections address these three categories of expert testimony.  In 
Section IV.A I examine the role of expert testimony to help the jury understand the witness’s 
ability to perceive or remember accurately or the witness’s bias.  In Section IV.B I discuss the 
use of expert testimony to help the jury understand behavior that may otherwise skew the jury’s 
assessment of credibility.  In Section IV.C I consider briefly the courts’ exclusion of expert 
testimony merely because it is consistent with the testimony of a witness. 
A. Expert Testimony Concerning Perception, Memory, or Bias 
 
character for (un)truthfulness.  Some courts have erroneously concluded that the admissibility of polygraph evidence 
is governed by Rule 608.  See, e.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989) (expressing 
view that polygraph test supporting claim that witness is telling the truth as to specific matters would be admissible 
under Rule 608(a) if witness’s credibility were first attacked); United States v. Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923, 927-28 
(S.D.Fla.1995) (accord); see also State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn.1984) (applies Rule 608(a) to justify 
admitting non-character testimony explaining behavior and addressing credibility in specific case). 
101 See note 65 supra.
102 See, e.g. United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding exclusion of expert who 
would have testified concerning memory); State v. Marine, 520 S.E.2d 65, 66-67 (N.C. 1999) (considering 
alternative grounds for admitting expert testimony).   
103 For examples of cases discussing the hesitancy of courts to admit certain expert testimony, see note 28.  See also 
Mullane, supra note 32, 68.  
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Experts often offer insight into credibility on grounds other than character.  Expert 
testimony may bolster or impeach a witness’s credibility by addressing the witness’s perception 
or memory as it would affect the accuracy of the witness’s testimony.104 Alternatively, expert 
testimony may explain how the witness may be influenced by a cognitive predisposition for or 
against a particular party due to bias or self-interest.  Experts equipped to provide insight into a 
witness’s capacity for perception, ability to remember, or bias offer valuable assistance to the 
jurors who must determine the credibility of the witness’s testimony.  The courts should 
generally admit such expert testimony. 
 Evidence that addresses a witness’s capacity to perceive or recall the events about which 
he or she testifies or evidence that reveals bias on the part of a witness makes an important 
contribution to the case.  Such evidence is not character evidence and should not be subject to the 
restrictive rules governing character evidence.  In United States v. Abel, 105 the Supreme Court 
emphasized the limited scope of Rule 608 and rejected the argument that the rule governed and 
limited the admissibility of evidence that tended to impeach by showing the witness’s bias. 
Emphasizing that Rule 608 applies only to character evidence, the Court held that evidence of 
bias is governed by Rules 402 and 403.  The evidence was presumptively admissible because it 
was relevant but could be excluded under Rule 403 if the unfair prejudice it injected into the case 
substantially outweighed its probative value as tending to show bias.106 Further, the Court 
emphasized the strong probative value of bias evidence.107 Like bias evidence, evidence relating 
to a witness’s capacity to perceive or remember should be evaluated under the relevancy rules 
rather than the character evidence rules.  Furthermore, the courts should recognize the evidence 
related to a witness’s strength or weakness of perception or memory has stronger probative value 
in assessing the credibility of the witness’s testimony than evidence of a general character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness.  Even a truthful witness should not be credited if the witness’s 
perception or memory of the events was impaired.   
 
104 Friedland, supra note 11, at 167 n. 15 (noting that most expert testimony addresses memory, perception and 
narration).).  See also United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that expert could have 
helped jury understand why witness with history of learning difficulties “appeared to struggle” while testifying at 
trial); Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (discussing difference between comment on 
truthfulness and comment on perception).  A number of disorders affect perception or memory.  They include 
conduct disorder, delerium, amnestic disorders, schizophrenia, delusional disorders, and depression.  See 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (American Psychiatric Association, 4th Ed., 2000).  
Those suffering from Conduct disorder may suffer from misperception: “Especially in ambiguous situations, 
aggressive individuals with this disorder misperceive the intention of others are more hostile and aggressive than is 
the case . . . .” Id. at 95.  A witness who suffered from delirium at the time of the events would experience “a 
disturbance of consciousness that is accompanied by a change in cognition . . . ,” “a reduced clarity of awareness of 
the environment,” and impairment of  “[t]he ability to focus, sustain, or shift attention.”  Id. at 137.  A witness 
suffering from an amnestic disorder may be “impaired in their ability to learn new information” or “unable to recall 
previously learned information about past events.” Id. at 172.  Schizophrenia is characterized by “a range of 
cognitive and emotional dysfunctions that include perception.”  Id. at 299.  Delusional Disorder involves “the 
presence of one or more nonbizarre delusions that persist for at least 1 month.”  Id. at 323.  Depression may impair 
the “ability to think, concentrate, or make decisions” and may lead to distraction or memory difficulties. Id. at 351. 
105 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984). 
106 See Abel, 469 U.S. at 49 (1984). 
107 See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51 (“A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make 
the facts to which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony.”).  See 
also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (emphasizing probative value of bias evidence); Imwinkelried, 
Federal Rule of Evidence, supra note 13, at 148-50 (discussing admissibility of bias evidence under the federal 
rules); Berger, supra note 7, at 584-86 (discussing Rule 608 and Abel). 
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The distinction between evidence addressing perception or memory and character 
evidence is critical.  In Washington v. Schriver,108 the Second Circuit recognized this distinction.  
In Schriver, the state trial court had excluded the testimony of the defendant’s expert, a 
psychologist who would have educated the jury concerning the perception and memory of 
children under seven.109 The Second Circuit concluded that the trial court had failed to draw the 
critical distinction between evidence bearing on credibility and that bearing on reliability of the 
witness’s testimony. 110 The court pointed out that, while restrictive rules apply to testimony 
addressing credibility, that is “the jury’s assessment of whether a witness is telling the truth,”111 
testimony addressing reliability, that is “whether the witness’s perception or memory is 
accurate,” is generally admissible.112 
A number of other courts have likewise acknowledged the importance of this type of 
evidence and have not found its tendency to bolster or impeach to be a barrier to admissibility.113 
In United States v. Partin,114 the defendant sought to present an expert who would explain that 
the witness’s mental condition “would have a tendency to affect his ability to see and hear” at the 
time of the alleged offenses, and the court recognized the role this type of evidence can play.115 
In State v. Gherasim,116 the appellate court overturned the trial court’s exclusion of the 
defendant’s expert testimony.117 The psychiatrist called by the defendant would have testified 
that the victim’s recall of being raped was impaired by a dissociative amnesic disorder.118 The 
expert explained that his testimony did not relate to truthfulness, but to the victim’s “mental 
 
108 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001). 
109 See 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001).  The court described the proposed testimony as follows: 
Dr. Steven Thurber, a psychologist who specializes in the field of child memory . . . proposed to testify that children 
under seven have trouble separating appearances from reality; that leading questions about sexual abuse and other 
subjects can cause young children to adopt information contained in the questions as remembered fact; that the use 
of anatomically correct dolls is unduly suggestive; and that the interrogation techniques used in this case by 
detectives, a social worker, assistant district attorneys, and doctors were leading and suggestive.   
Id. at 50. 
110 See 255 F.3d at 60. The court nevertheless held that the exclusion of the evidence in the defendant’s state trial did 
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  See id. 
111 Schriver, 255 F.3d at 59.  
112 Schriver, 255 F.3d. at 59; see also State v. Heath, 341 S.E.2d 565, 568 (N.C. 1986)  (noting that expert opinion 
regarding whether the victim had a mental condition that would “cause her to fantasize about sexual assaults” would 
be admissible). 
113 See, e.g., State v. Padilla, 704 P.2d 524 (Or. 1985) (upholding conviction where expert testified that child could 
accurately perceive and relate sexual contact). 
114 493 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974). 
115 See Partin, 493 F.2d at 764.  In Partin, the trial court excluded the testimony because the expert “could not state 
to any degree of medical certainty that [the witness] could not perceive or understand what was happening around 
him” at the time of the events, and the Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial court should have permitted the jury to 
hear this testimony.  Id. The court also held that the defendant should have been permitted to use certain medical and 
psychiatric records on cross-examination to undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses.  The court noted 
“[t]he readily apparent principle is that the jury should, within reason, be informed of all matters affecting a 
witness’s credibility to aid in their determination of the truth.” Id. at 762.  The records in question revealed that the 
witness was suffering from auditory hallucinations just a few months before the events as to which he testified.  See 
also Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1971) (recognizing that “insanity or mental abnormality 
either at the time of observing the facts which he reports in his testimony, or at the time of testifying, may be 
provable, on cross-examination or by extrinsic evidence, as bearing on credibility). 
116 985 P.2d 1257 (Or. 1999). 
117 See Gherasim, 985 P.2d 1257,at 1268 (Or. 1999). 
118 See Gherasim, 985 P.2d at 1269. 
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ability” to recall the events accurately.119 The trial court concluded that the expert’s testimony 
impermissibly commented on the victim’s credibility and that the jury could assess her 
credibility without expert assistance.120 The Oregon appellate courts concluded that the expert’s 
opinion concerning the witness’s “capacity to remember what had occurred on the night that she 
was assaulted” would have been helpful to the jury and should have been admitted.121 
Similarly, in cases where the jury has learned that a witness suffers from mental illness, 
the court should allow expert testimony regarding whether the witness can distinguish reality 
from fantasy.  Such testimony bolsters the witness’s credibility if it helps allay the jury’s possible 
concern that the mental illness interferes with the witness’s ability to perceive and remember.  Its 
more important role, however, is to provide essential information to the jury.122 
Not all courts have recognized the value of this expert testimony.123 The influence of the 
common law maxim is apparent.  Some courts overlook the significance of testimony addressing 
perception and memory and view the expert’s testimony as invading the province of the jury.124 
119 See Gherasim, 985 P.2d at 1270. 
120 See Gherasim, 985 P.2d at 1271. The trial court was persuaded in part by the expert’s response to questions on 
cross-examination that pushed him to state his conclusion that the victim’s account was probably not accurate. See 
id. 
121 See Gherasim, 985 P.2d at 1272. 
122 Eberhardt v. State, 359 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ga. 1987) (concluding that the testimony was relevant and not asked 
“merely for the purpose of bolstering the credibility of the victim.”); People v. Acklin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1980) (discussing admissibility of expert testimony to explain witness’s infirmities); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 
642, 645-46 (Utah 2000) (holding expert testimony addressing witness’s mental capacity admissible); State v. 
Froehlich, 635 P.2d 127 (Wash. 1981) (concluding that expert was properly permitted to testify concerning 
witness’s memory). 
123 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Crawford, 718 A.2d 768 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the trial court had not abused its 
discretion by excluding expert testimony on suppressed recollection).  In Crawford, the trial court excluded entirely 
the testimony of an expert who advanced a number of reasons to distrust the recollection of the prosecution witness 
testifying on the basis for memories that had been suppressed for almost twenty years. See id. at 771.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized its consistent statements that determinations of credibility are exclusively 
for the jury, as well as the fact that the prosecution did not characterize the testimony as based on recovered 
memory. See id. at 772-73.  See also Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 392-95 (2d Cir. 2005) (ascribing 
no legitimate role to expert testimony offering an explanation – “the misperception hypothesis” – for the apparent 
inconsistency between the defendants’ account of the shooting and the physical evidence). 
124 See, e.g., Nichols v. American National Insurance Company, 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998).  In Nichols, the 
plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit complained that the defendant’s expert psychiatrist had been permitted to give 
the following testimony: 
Dr. Pribor testified that Nichols had poor psychiatric credibility. She defined this as poor ability to assess the cause 
of her own psychological state or to report her psychological symptoms accurately. In reaching this assessment she 
relied on her conclusions that Nichols had multiple psychiatric stressors in her life but that she focused only on her 
experience at American National, that Nichols said she had no psychological problems before working for American 
National, that Nichols did not want to be in Dr. Pribor's office and refused to answer some of her questions, that 
Nichols had had difficulties at several jobs in the past, and that her claims of harassment changed over time. Dr. 
Pribor testified that Nichols had difficulty interpreting social settings and a tendency to blur fantasy with reality. She 
also stated that in an independent evaluation “you need to interpret and weigh what they tell you” or else “you can 
get a very skewed and inaccurate view of what actually happened.” 
 Dr. Pribor also gave her opinion that Dr. Tyndall had been influenced by the way Nichols related what had 
happened to her. She said that Nichols had recall bias and that her statements were affected by secondary gain and 
malingering She testified that “recall bias” refers to an individual's belief that she has not experienced certain 
symptoms even though her medical records indicate otherwise, such as Nichols' statement that she had not 
experienced symptoms of depression and anxiety before she worked at American National. She defined “secondary 
gain” as the possibility that claimed psychological symptoms are motivated by financial gain and mentioned the 
potential for secondary gain in litigation where money is sought. She criticized Dr. Tyndall for using a structured 
interview in diagnosing PTSD because it could allow Nichols to act under the influence of secondary gain and recall 
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For example, in Westcott v. Crinklaw,125 a civil rights action against a police officer, the trial 
court permitted the defendant’s expert to testify that the defendant was “exhibiting symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress syndrome,” a disorder that could cause incomplete memory and impair one’s 
ability to provide an accurate account of events, but the Eighth Circuit reversed.126 The plaintiff 
had introduced the statements the defendant made immediately after the shooting.  The defendant 
claimed that the statements were not accurate and offered expert testimony to provide insight 
into the possible effect of posttraumatic stress on the defendant at the time he made the 
statements, which may have caused him to make inaccurate assertions.  The Eighth Circuit 
condemned the testimony because it “directly addressed the credibility of [the defendant].”127 
Actually, the expert testimony represented precisely the type of information that can enhance the 
jurors’ assessment of credibility by arming them with increased knowledge related to perception 
and memory.128 
The following three sections examine the way in which courts have handled expert 
testimony in three specific contexts: eyewitness testimony, post-hypnosis testimony, and the 
testimony of child witnesses.  In each of these contexts, courts have let go of the maxim that 
experts are not permitted to address credibility and opened the door to expert testimony that will 




Erroneous eyewitness identification has contributed to the conviction of innocent 
defendants.129 Experts on eyewitness identification can help jurors understand the psychological 
dynamics of identification and, most critical, overcome erroneous assumptions that infect 
 
bias, “and this is-I mean this is what happened.” She also defined “malingering” as feigning or making up symptoms 
for the purpose of secondary gain. 
154 F.3d at 882.  The plaintiff argued that this testimony impermissibly addressed the plaintiff’s “veracity and 
credibility,” and the Eighth Circuit agreed.  The court stated, “[s]uch evidence is not helpful if it draws inferences or 
reaches conclusions within the jury’s competence or within an exclusive function of the jury.”  154 F.3d at 883.  The 
court expressed concern that the evidence might confuse or mislead the jury, “causing it to substitute the expert’s 
credibility assessment for its own common sense determination.”  The court drew the line between testimony that 
“explain[ed] psychiatric terms and the situations in which they may arise” and testimony that expressed the expert’s 
own opinion that the plaintiff’s statements to her expert “were influenced by recall bias, secondary gain, and 
malingering.”  154 F.3d at 884.  The testimony “impermissibly instructed the jury on how to weigh the evidence.”  
154 F.3d at 884.  The court overlooked the insight the expert provided into the plaintiff’s perception and memory of 
the critical events. 
125 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995). 
126 See Westcott, 68 F.3d at 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995). 
127 The court stated:  
The testimony before us . . . is the same type [as in Azure and Whitted], as it provides a psychological label or 
diagnosis as a way of excusing or justifying [the defendant’s] statements made immediately after the shooting.  The 
accuracy of these statements is a pure question of credibility.   
68 F.3d at 1077. 
The court then remarked that Azure and Whitted “plainly stand for the proposition that expert testimony going to the 
issue of credibility is not admissible.”68 F.3d at 1077.  Characterizing the issue as “close,” the Eighth Circuit held 
that the trial court had committed reversible error by admitting the evidence. 68 F.3d at 1077.   
128 See also United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting expert testimony that would have 
provided insight into witness’ accuracy of perception and memory). 
129 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 101-137 (2001); see also Abdur-Raheem v. Kelly, 98 F.Supp.2d 
295, 305-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing dangers of eyewitness identification testimony). 
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assessment of eyewitness identification.130 Specifically, the expert can help jurors understand 
the way in which vagaries of perception and memory undermine the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification.  Given the probative value of psychological insights into eyewitness 
identification,131 a qualified expert should be permitted to testify concerning the psychology of 
eyewitness identification.   
The long battle over the admissibility of expert testimony relating to eyewitness 
identification is instructive.132 The cases reveal the courts’ resistance to expertise touching on 
witness credibility.133 They also illustrate the ways in which the courts justify exclusion of 
expert testimony even though it speaks directly to the ways in which perception and memory can 
generate false but convincing identification testimony.  Furthermore, an examination of the 
relevant cases reveals an increasing acceptance of this testimony. 
Many courts have been unreceptive to expert testimony addressing eyewitness 
credibility.134 The reluctance to admit expert testimony on identification appears attributable to 
the courts’ adherence to the prohibition on expert testimony addressing credibility and, at least in 
part, to the fact that the judges asked to rule on the question share the misconceptions that the 
expert testimony was intended to counteract.   
In Neil v. Biggers,135 the Supreme Court set out the factors to be considered in 
determining whether identification testimony is sufficiently reliable: 
 
130 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1030-32 (discussing science of eyewitness identification). 
131 See Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Testimony, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 909 (1995) (“The mounting evidence of eyewitness error is one of the major bases of the argument that expert 
courtroom testimony by research psychologists about eyewitness testimony is sometimes required as a means of 
providing jurors education and perspective about eyewitness testimony.”); Edward Stein, The Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness Identification, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 295 (2003) 
(espousing importance of experts to explain fallibility of eyewitness testimony); Rene L. Valladares & Franny 
Forsman, Attacking Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony After Daubert, 21-JUN CHAMPION 60 (1997) (asserting 
need to allow experts to explain unreliability of eyewitness testimony); Wayne T. Westling,  The Case for Expert 
Witness Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93, 103 (1992) (“An expert 
witness should be allowed to present scientific data about the reliability or unreliability of eyewitness testimony to 
the jury.”).  
132 See Stein, supra note 131, at 295 (explaining fit between expert testimony and eyewitness identification); Berger, 
supra note 7, at 601-04 (pointing out shift in decisions concerning expert testimony on eyewitness identification); 
Mullane, supra note 32, at 98-104. 
133 See United States v. Crotteau, 218 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding thorough cross-examination precludes 
need for experts on fallibility of eyewitness identification); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 
1999) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, discussing Seventh Circuit's reluctance 
to admit such evidence and noting that it does not assist the jury); United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 
1999) (declaring testimony of expert on eyewitness identification inadmissible as invading jury’s province of 
credibility determination); United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification does not assist the jury and that jury can subject identification to “common-
sense evaluation”); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994) (deciding expert testimony could be 
confusing and misleading, negating helpfulness); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“Judicial resistance to the introduction of this kind of expert testimony is understandable given its innovativeness 
and the fear of trial delay spawned by the specter of the creation of a cottage industry of forensic psychologists.”). 
See also Stein, supra note 131, at 295.  
134 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-84 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification); People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155, 1165 (Ill. App. 1990) (rejecting testimony of leading 
expert on eyewitness reliability); see also Simmons, supra note 7, at 1032-37 (discussing case law governing expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification). 
135 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
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[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the 
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of 
attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation.136 
Since Biggers was decided in 1972, the approach it defines has been repeatedly reaffirmed.137 
As a result, courts often view expert opinion as unnecessary to help the jury assess credibility.138 
Indeed, the courts remain committed to the Biggers’ factors despite the strong psychological 
evidence to the contrary.  
 Psychological research has demonstrated that Biggers rests on erroneous beliefs about 
eyewitness identification.139 The list of factors includes factors that have little relationship to the 
accuracy of the identification.  For example, the fact that the witness provides an accurate 
description of the perpetrator is not a good predictor of correctness of the identification.140 The 
eyewitness’s sense of confidence can be unintentionally artificially enhanced by the lineup 
procedures employed by law enforcement.141 Thus, in this arena expert testimony can play a 
 
136 See 409 U.S. at 188, 199-200 (1972). 
137 See e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, n.10 (1982) (noting Court’s acceptance of various factors in 
Biggers); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (“The factors to be considered [regarding the admissibility 
of identification testimony] are those set out in Biggers.”); see also United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 139 
(3d Cir. 2006) (discussing totality of circumstances approach announced in Biggers); Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 
459, 472 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In judging reliability, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the factors 
described in . . . Biggers.”); United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir. 2003) (reasoning that starting 
point for admissibility of identification testimony is list of factors set forth in Biggers). 
138 See, e.g., United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 619-22 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding exclusion of defendant’s 
expert eyewitness testimony where trial court stated testimony would have improperly invaded jury’s province); 
United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274,  277-78 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court’s decision to exclude defendant’s 
expert where trial court had “noted the risks of confronting the jury with battles of experts on areas within the 
common-sense competence of jurors”); Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176,  1182 (Pa. 1993) (holding that 
testimony concerning the effect of stress on identification was properly excluded because it would have intruded on 
the jury’s role).  In Langan, the court stated, that “the hazards of eyewitness identification are within the ordinary 
knowledge of most lay jurors.”  263 F.3d at 613, 624.  In Downing, the Third Circuit noted that a number of courts 
had excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identification because the jury could adequately assess the question by 
applying common sense, but concluded that the evidence should be admitted under Rule 702 in the proper 
circumstances.  753 F.2d at 1229-31. 
139 See generally Gary L. Wells, et al, Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and 
Photospreads, 22 LAW  & HUM. BEHAVIOR 1 (1998) (discussing research and making recommendations); Gary L. 
Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”:  Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of 
the experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360-376 (1998) (finding,  that “confidence tends to be only modestly 
related to eyewitness” identification accuracy” and such confidence is malleable, subject to “[c]onfidence inflation” 
after “feedback manipulation”); Gary L. Wells, Verbal Descriptions of Faces From Memory: Are They Diagnostic 
of Identification Accuracy?, 70(4) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 619-626 (1985) (calling into question Biggers factors).  
Specifically, Wells suggests that the Court is wrong to rely on the accuracy of verbal descriptions when assessing 
the accuracy of the identification.  See id. Although Wells acknowledges that his findings support the Court’s 
approach, he did state that “it appears that the relationship between descriptions of faces and the identification of 
faces is not due to a process wherein good describers are good identifiers.”  Id.; see also  Melissa Piggot & John C. 
Brigham, Relationship Between Accuracy of Prior Description and Facial Recognition, 70(3) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
547-555 (1985) (noting that “[r]esearch findings from other paradigms also suggest that people's ability to recall 
something seen previously will not be strongly related to their ability to identify the same object on a recognition 
test”).  Piggot and Brigham went on to find that “[t]here was no relationship between subjects' accuracy in 
describing the target person and the accuracy with which they recognized him in a photograph lineup.”  Id. 
140 Wells et al, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 139, at 2. 
141 Wells et al, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 139,at 2. 
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useful role educating not only the jury but also the court concerning the credibility of eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
 Nevertheless, the development of this psychological literature has not persuaded all 
courts that expert testimony has value to the jury in cases of eyewitness identification.  In United 
States v. Lumpkin,142 the Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of the defendant’s expert on 
eyewitness identification. The defendant sought to have the expert explain to the jury that an 
eyewitness’s confidence in her identification does not correlate to, or effectively predict accuracy 
of that identification.143 The defendant argued that the evidence was necessary “to rebut the 
natural assumption that the confidence shown by [the witnesses] indicated reliability.”144 The 
court held that the evidence would have intruded on the jury’s “task of assessing witness 
credibility” and “intrud[ed] too much on the traditional province of the jury to assess credibility.”  
The court expressed concern that the proffered testimony would have usurped the jury’s role and 
stated that it might even have “placed the officers’ credibility here in jeopardy.”145 
In United States v. Langan,146 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
preclude the defense expert from testifying.  The court assumed that expert testimony would 
ultimately have clouded the issues: 
Although we recognize that expert testimony on eyewitness identification might inform the jury 
on all of the intricacies of perception, retention, and recall, we nevertheless agree with the district 
court that the hazards of eyewitness identification are within the ordinary knowledge of most lay 
jurors. * * * [I]t is likely that an uninformative battle of experts would have occurred if the 
government had offered its own expert testimony in order to refute [the defense expert], and the 
jury could have been unduly misled and confused.147 
These decisions illustrate the overprotective attitude toward the jury and mis-assessment 
of the evidence.148 Expert testimony on eyewitness identification is largely counterintuitive and 
therefore necessary to address the jury’s natural tendency to credit witnesses who testify with 
confidence to their identification of the defendant.149 These courts excluded legitimate expert 
testimony necessary to counteract the jurors’ natural tendency to view confidence on the stand as 
a signal of reliability.   
Other courts, however, have moved toward admission of this expert testimony.150 In 
United States v. Downing,151 the Third Circuit emphatically repudiated the trial court’s 
 
142 192 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 1999). 
143 See 192 F.3d at 288.  
144 192 F.3d at 289.  
145 192 F.3d at 290.  The court also expressed concern that the expert’s testimony would have usurped the role of the 
trial judge because it was at odds with the jury instruction that witness confidence is a factor to be considered in 
assessing the credibility of eyewitness identification.  192 F.3d id. at 289. 
146 263 F.3d 613 (6th Cir. 2001). 
147 Langan, 263 F.3d 613,2d at 624 (6th Cir. 2001). 
148 See also United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d, 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1995) (excluding expert testimony explaining that the 
eyewitness’s confidence in the identification can be artificially enhanced by the way in which the police conduct the 
identification). 
149 See Stein, supra note 131, at 295. 
150 The trend appears to be in favor of admitting testimony by eyewitness identification experts.  See United States v. 
Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing trend to admit expert testimony on the question of eyewitness 
identification); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274,  277 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing that judicial opinion on the 
value of expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications was becoming more receptive); United States v. 
Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding exclusion of eyewitness expert in case but acknowledging 
its admissibility in some circumstances).  See generally Simmons, supra note 7, at 1032-37 (discussing developing 
acceptance of expert testimony on eyewitness identification as well as continuing limitations on the testimony). 
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conclusion that the expert witness would “usurp the ‘function of the jury’” as a basis for 
exclusion.152 More recently, in United States v. Brownlee,153 the trial court limited the expert’s 
testimony concerning eyewitness identification and the Third Circuit reversed, emphasizing the 
importance of admitting expert testimony to educate jurors who come to the case unaware of the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification.154 
2. Post-hypnosis testimony
The decisions dealing with hypnotically refreshed memory stand in stark contrast to those 
dealing with eyewitness identification.155 In the middle of the twentieth century, hypnosis came 
into use as a means of refreshing witnesses’ memories.156 Research soon demonstrated the risks 
 
151 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). 
152 See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1224, 1228 (3d Cir. 1985). The court noted that Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue 
rule and “rejects as ‘empty rhetoric’ the notion that some testimony is inadmissible because it usurps the ‘province 
of the jury.’” Id. at 1229.  The court therefore surmised that the district court may have ruled on the erroneous basis 
that “an expert’s testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications is never admissible in federal 
court because such testimony concerns a matter of common experience that the jury is itself presumed to possess.”  
Id. 
153 454 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2006). 
154 See 454 F.3d at 131, 140-43 (3d Cir. 2006).  See also United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 341 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that trial court should have admitted most of the offered testimony concerning aspects of eyewitness 
identification but agreeing with exclusion of expert testimony explaining that viewing an object for a longer period 
of time would produce a more accurate memory, since information was “rather pedestrian”); United States v. 
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1398-1401 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s exclusion of defense expert’s testimony 
concerning suggestiveness of identification from wanted board and way in which initial identification may have 
infected victims’ later identifications as pedestrian points that did not require expert insight but holding court erred 
by excluding expert testimony concerning lack of correlation between confidence of identification testimony and its 
accuracy because information was “counterintuitive” and expert testimony was therefore quite helpful); United 
States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification was not reversible error even though testimony “is not simply a recitation of facts available through 
common knowledge” but is “largely counter-intuitive”) (emphasis in original).  
155 “Hypnosis has been defined as an alteration in consciousness and concentration, in which the subject manifests a 
heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness is maintained.’ See” Richard G. Montevideo, Hypnosis – 
Should the Courts Snap Out of It? – A Closer Look at the Critical Issues, 44 OHIO ST. LJ., 1053, 1055 (1983)( 
“‘Hypnosis has been defined as an alteration in consciousness and concentration, in which the subject manifests a 
heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness is maintained.’”) (quoting Spector & Foster, Admissibility of 
Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 570 (1977)).  See also R.T.C., Note, 
The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1206-14 (1981) (discussing history, 
scientific background and effect of hypnosis).   
156 “It was the acceptance of hypnosis, as a therapeutic tool, in the 1950s and 60s that reawakened the hypnosis 
controversy and produced a flurry of judicial activity during the last twenty-five years.”  David S. McDonald, 
Comment, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 14 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 361, 366 (1987).  ) (“It was 
the acceptance of hypnosis, as a therapeutic tool, in the 1950s and 60s that reawakened the hypnosis controversy and 
produced a flurry of judicial activity during the last twenty-five years.” ); see also Lisa K. Rozzano, The Use of 
Hypnosis in Criminal Trials: The Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 645 (1988) (“As hypnosis 
came to be recognized as a valuable tool in criminal investigations, the phenomenon found its way into courtrooms. 
An increasing number of cases ruled on the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony when it formed the 
basis of the case against a criminal defendant.”).  Some courts simply admitted the evidence.  See, e.g., Wyller v. 
Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding hypnotically refreshed testimony admissible); Harding 
v. State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. 1968) (holding victim properly allowed to testify after hypnosis restored otherwise 
irretrievable memories of assault and rape as hypnosis may affect credibility as determined by jury, but not 
admissibility); State v. Jorgensen, 492 P.2d 312 (Or. 1971) (holding objections over hypnosis go to weight, not 
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of this practice, establishing the impact of hypnosis on the witness’s testimony and the difficulty 
of untangling the genuine memory from that established through hypnosis.157 Two approaches 
emerged.  One was to bar the testimony altogether.158 The other was to allow the witness to 
testify but also admit expert testimony concerning the effect of hypnosis.159 Rather than 
adhering to the maxim that questions of credibility are for the jury, the courts understood the 
importance of educating the jury on the impact of hypnosis on the witness’s ability to remember 
and narrate accurately. 160 
3. Testimony of child witnesses 
Courts have also wrestled with the use of expert testimony to help jurors understand 
issues of perception and memory in young witnesses and have generally been more receptive to 
this use of expert testimony.161 Cases involving allegations of sexual abuse of children raise 
special concerns with perception and memory.  In these cases, the jury can benefit from the 
insights of expert testimony.   
Courts do not always see the important role of such testimony.162 For example, in United 
States v. Binder,163 the trial court admitted expert testimony informing the jury that the children 
 
admissibility, of testimony).  Others admitted the testimony only with procedural safeguards.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 1981) (holding hypnotically refreshed testimony must meet acceptability standard of 
scientific evidence in order to be admitted); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d 246, 252 (N.M. Ct. App. 1811981) (“post-
hypnotic recollections, revived by the hypnosis procedure, are only admissible in a trial where a proper foundation 
has also first established the expertise of the hypnotist and that the techniques employed were correctly performed, 
free from bias or improper suggestibility.”).  
157 See generally Rozzano, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials, 21 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.SUPRA NOTE at 639-44 
(1988) (explaining dangers of hypnosis including suggestibility, confabulation and overconfidence).  
158 The per se inadmissible approach to hypnotically refreshed memory as the basis for testimony began in 1980. See 
McDonald, Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 14 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 361SUPRA NOTE at 370 
(citing State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), where court applied Frye test to hypnosis and finding that it 
did meet necessary requirements); see also McQueen v. Garrison, 619 F.Supp. 116, 131 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding 
expert’s testimony about unreliability of hypnosis made admission of witness’s testimony improper); Watson v. 
State, 604 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. 2004) (holding that witness may only testify as to statements made before hypnosis 
refreshed memories); People v. Sutton, 812 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding witness’s refreshed memories 
are not admissible);  State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (overruling Harding, adopting Mack per 
se inadmissible approach to hypnosis); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1981).   
159 See, e.g., Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (upholding conviction based on hypnotically refreshed 
testimony noting that the jury had received the benefit of expert testimony as to the possible effects hypnosis to help 
it assess the credibility of the witness and accuracy of the testimony); People v Hughes, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983) 
(noting that post hypnotic testimony may be challenged with expert testimony concerning the potential effect of the 
hypnosis on the witness's recollections); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983) (suggesting use of expert 
testimony to help the jury assess credibility of hypnotized witness). 
160 See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (noting that expert testimony can be used to educate jury 
concerning risks of post-hypnosis testimony); but see United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(permitting use of testimony on effects of hypnosis).  In Awkard, the court held that, had the defense attempted to 
discredit the witness on the grounds that the witness had been hypnotized, the permissible testimony would have 
been limited to “the general nature and usual effects of hypnosis, and the details of [the expert’s] hypnosis of [the 
witness].” 597 F.2d at 671.  The expert should not under any circumstances be permitted to testify that the witness’ 
memory had been “accurately refreshed.” Id. at 671. 
161 See Friedland, supra note 11, at 202-03 (asserting, that “admission of general credibility testimony occurs most 
often in cases involving sexual abuse and child witnesses” and citing authority). 
162 See Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (summarizing authority concerning admissibility of 
expert testimony concerning manipulation and fantasy in child witnesses). 
163 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985).   
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who testified “were able to distinguish reality from fantasy and truth from falsehood.”164 This 
testimony provided insight into the perception of the witnesses, a five year old and a seven year 
old, and, doing so, offered assistance to the jury in determining credibility in the case.  However, 
the Ninth Circuit misconceived the role of the expert testimony and held that it should not have 
been admitted, citing the maxim that credibility is for the jury to determine and concluding that 
the expert testimony invaded the province of the jury.165 The court expressed the view that 
expert testimony offered to show that the complaining witnesses were “able to distinguish reality 
from fantasy and truth from falsehood” “improperly buttressed” the witnesses’ credibility.166 
The court stated, further, that the jurors “did not need additional assistance” in assessing the 
credibility of the witnesses and characterized the expert testimony as asserting “that these 
particular children in this particular case could be believed.”167 In the court’s view, “[t]he jury in 
effect was impermissibly being asked to accept an expert’s determination that these particular 
witnesses were truthful.”168 Justice Wallace, concurring in part and dissenting in part, more 
accurately understood the role of the expert testimony.  He pointed out that the experts “testified 
only that the children were capable of telling the truth – they did not opine as to whether or not 
the children actually had done so.”169 Given the importance of determining whether a young 
witness is capable of accurate perception, memory and narration, expert testimony addressing the 
maturity of the young witnesses’ perception would have been helpful to the jury. 
 Other courts accept the legitimate role expert testimony can play helping the jury 
evaluate the credibility of the children’s testimony.170 For example, in Doe By and Through G.S.
v. Johnson,171 the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that expert testimony improperly 
invaded the province of the jury.  The expert explained the circumstances that could have caused 
the child to allege sexual abuse out of self-interest.172 
Even courts that accept the value of the expert testimony recognize that the testimony 
should be confined to a discussion of perception and memory but should not extend to a direct 
 
164 See Binder, 769 F.2d 595 at 602 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 57-58 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony on children’s suggestibility was not constitutional 
error). 
165See  Binder, 769 F.2d at 595, 601.  
166 See Binder, 769 F.2d at 602.  
167 See Binder, 769 F.2d at 602. 
168 See Binder, 769 F.2d at 602. 
169 See Binder, 769 F.2d at 605. 
170 See, e.g., Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing value of expert testimony 
explaining memory and perception in child witnesses); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(allowing testimony concerning how two different events may become linked in child’s memory).  See generally 
Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 
55, 94 -95 (1998) (discussing Rouse and remarking that “an increasing number of jurisdictions are turning to the 
admissibility criteria of Daubert for resolution of admissibility questions regarding the social sciences and 
psychological evidence.”); Bennett L. Gershman, Child Witnesses and Procedural Fairness, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 
585, 587-591 (2001) (explaining approaches of different courts to child credibility/suggestibility evidence); Thomas 
Lyon, The New Wave In Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1004 (1999) (providing 
overview of suggestibility/credibility evidence in child witness cases); see also John E.B. Myers, A Decade of 
International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward a Child Witness 
Code, 28 Pac. L.J. 169, 182 (1996) (discussing history of child witness credibility and attacks  thereon). 
171 52 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1995) 
172 See Johnson, 52 F.3d at 1463 (reporting that expert testified that parents rewarded child for making allegations 
and punished her for recanting). 
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assessment of truthfulness in the case.  In United States v. Rouse,173 the Eighth Circuit stated the 
general rule and posed the problem: 
A qualified expert may explain to the jury the dangers of implanted memory and suggestive 
practices when interviewing or questioning child witnesses, but may not opine as to a child 
witness’s credibility.  That leaves a troublesome line for the trial judge to draw – as the expert 
applies his or her general opinions and experiences to the case at hand, at what point does this 
more specific opinion testimony become an undisguised, impermissible comment on a child 
victim’s veracity?174 
In Johnson v. Doe,175 for example, the court held that the expert testified properly where the 
expert “discussed the possibility that [the child]’s allegations were influenced by [her adopted 
mother]’s contemporaneous research into child abuse.”176 The expert stopped short of offering a 
specific opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses.177 The testimony appropriately helped the 
jury focus on a factor that could have influenced the witness’s perception. 
 The evolution of the law in these three areas offers hope that courts will, over time, 
recognize the value of expert testimony on other questions of perception and memory.  Courts 
should take a lesson from the initial resistance to and eventual acceptance of the expertise 
offered to help the jury with questions of credibility when faced with eyewitness identification 
testimony, post-hypnosis testimony, and the testimony of children.  Courts should be more 
receptive to expert testimony that addresses issues of perception, memory, and bias, realizing 
that the testimony may improve the jury’s assessment of credibility. 
 
B. Expert Testimony Explaining Behavior 
 
Expert witnesses are also called on to explain the behavior of witnesses in order to help 
the jurors understand the significance of a pattern of behavior.178 Because the expert’s guidance 
 
173 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997). 
174 Rouse, 111 F.3d at 571. As reported in the panel decision that was vacated, the precluded testimony was as 
follows: 
Q And based on your review of [the trial testimony] and your review of the records, all the files in this matter, is it 
your belief that there’s been a practice of suggestibility employed in these techniques? 
A Yes, sir. 
Id. at 566; see also id. at 568-69 (discussing expert’s testimony in more detail).  The court concluded that if the 
exclusion of the testimony was error, it was harmless.  Id. at 572; see also United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172 
(8th Cir. 1989).  In Provost, the court held that the court-appointed expert witness had not strayed into improper 
vouching.  The expert, a psychologist, explained the victim’s linking of two events, stating that sexually abused 
children might link two events in time even though they occurred on separate occasions because one might act as a 
triggering mechanism. 875 F.2d at 176.  Explaining why the victim may have linked the two events, the expert 
stated “an elementary basic thing is that whether or not they were contingent in time they both occurred . . . .”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  The court characterized the testimony as “at most, an implied statement of her belief that 
[the witness] was telling the truth.” Id. The court did not approve the form of the testimony and actually concluded 
that it came close to, but did not cross, line established in Azure. See id. 
175 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1995).  See also Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (discussing 
admissibility of expert testimony concerning manipulation of child witnesses). 
176 Johnson, 234 F.3d at 1463. 
177 See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 1463.  
178 See People v. Simpkins, 697 N.E.2d 302, 312 (Ill. App. 1998) (distinguishing between expert testimony that 
explains behavior and expert testimony that improperly comments on witness credibility).  See generally Friedland, 
supra note 11, at 175, 201 (commenting experts may explain behavior or common characteristics of class of 
witnesses such as victims of sexual abuse or child witnesses).  This article does not address the particular problems 
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will encourage the jurors either to credit or to discredit the witness, this testimony also plays an 
impeaching or bolstering role, and therefore sometimes falls prey to the maxim.179 Like expert 
testimony concerning perception or memory, this category of expert testimony is not governed 
by Rule 608, since it does not address character for truthfulness.  Instead, its admissibility should 
be assessed under Rules 402 and 403 and the rules governing expert testimony.  Moreover, it 
generally offers stronger probative value than standard character impeachment evidence.  If it 
satisfies the rules on expert testimony, it should generally be admitted because it is relevant and 
not otherwise excluded.   
 The law has consistently recognized that evidence of behavior has probative value 
providing insight into the mental state of the actor.180 Jurors are routinely urged to view the 
credibility of a witness or party through the prism of their behavior.  The witness’s prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible to cast light on the witness’s truthfulness at trial.181 
Evidence that the victim of a sexual assault made a prompt complaint is frequently admissible to 
corroborate the witness’s testimony.182 If a criminal defendant fled or changed appearance to 
avoid apprehension, that evidence is admissible to show consciousness of guilt.183 Law 
enforcement officers are often permitted to testify as experts to explain the significance of certain 
behavior or language used by the defendants.184 Expert testimony giving the jurors insight into 
the probative significance of particular behavior is simply another example of evidence falling in 
this general category.  Whether the witness’s behavior suggests that the witness’s factual account 
of events is accurate or inaccurate, the expert may help the jury understand the behavior and its 
significance in the case.   
 Two situations, discussed in the following sections, illustrate the value of such expert 
testimony.  First, experts can help jurors understand why a defendant may have given a false 
confession.   Second, experts can help explain the sometimes counterintuitive conduct of abuse 
victims to jurors. 
 
1. Confession cases 
Expert testimony may assist the jury to evaluate a defendant’s challenge to the credibility 
of his or her own confession.  Jurors may have difficulty comprehending that a suspect would 
confess to a crime she did not commit, yet false confessions do occur.185 Expert testimony can 
explain the circumstances and personal characteristics that may generate a false confession.   
 
that arise if the prosecution seeks to use an expert to describe a pattern of behavior of a particular type of criminal.  
Such evidence can generate the risk that the jury will convict the defendant for fitting a profile rather than actually 
committing the charged offense.  See, e.g., Turtle v. State, 600 So. 2d 1214, 1221 (Fla. 1992) (reversing conviction 
where prosecution expert described general patterns of behavior typical of pedophiles and prosecution urged jury to 
view defendant’s behavior in that light).  
179 See Berger, supra note 7, at 613-14 (asserting that the evidence acts as testimony about credibility). 
180 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  See generally BROUN ET AL., supra note 15, at § 190 (discussing evidence of bad acts 
as proof of mental state). 
181 See BROUN ET AL., supra note 15, at §§ 34-38 (discussing evidentiary use of prior inconsistent statements). 
182 See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REV. 441 (1996) (discussing rule). 
183 BROUN ET AL., supra note 15, at §§ 263-65 (discussing evidence of consciousness of guilt). One commentator 
suggests that polygraph evidence acts as evidence of guilty conscience rather than of credibility or truth telling.  See 
Simmons, supra note 7, at 1038-39. 
184 Nossel, supra note 26, at 250-56 (reviewing case law on law enforcement officers testifying as experts). 
185 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 101-137 (2001); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions in SAUNDRA WESTERVELT ET AL, WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED 
JUSTICE (2001).  
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Although the common law protection of the jury’s special province may prompt 
reluctance to admit such testimony, courts have recognized its value. 186 In Pritchett v. 
Commonwealth,187 for example, the defendant offered expert testimony to explain that the mildly 
retarded defendant was compliant and prone to suggestibility and probably said whatever the 
police wanted him to say.188 The trial court excluded the testimony, concluding that it would 
“invade the province of the jury as to the ultimate issue” of the defendant’s intent at the time of 
the crime.189 However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed and concluded that the 
evidence offered to play a key role in helping the jury to understand the defendant’s behavior.  
Similarly, in United States v. Vallejo,190 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court committed 
error when it refused to permit the defense expert to explain the defendant’s communication 
problems in an effort to “help the jury understand how he struggled to comprehend and 
communicate during the interrogation.”191 Expert testimony in these cases can play an important 
role in educating the jurors concerning conduct that would otherwise be inexplicable. 
 
2. Abuse cases  
Expert testimony has also been presented to explain behavior of victims of sexual or 
spousal abuse. In some cases, the conduct threatens to undermine the witness’s credibility, and 
the expert testimony in these cases is presented to help the jury understand the behavior which 
otherwise may appear to the jurors to be inconsistent or irrational.  In other cases, an expert may 
be used to attack the witness’s credibility by establishing that the witness did not behave in the 
expected manner. 
Although such testimony has frequently been challenged as impermissible bolstering 
invading the province of the jury, experts have been allowed to explain to the jury why the 
victims behaved in ways that are counterintuitive to the ordinary juror, such as failing to report 
incidents of abuse or staying with an abusive spouse.192 In these cases, the expert does not so 
 
186 See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that defense expert should have been 
allowed to testify and “would have let the jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to 
recognize it, and how to decide whether it fit the facts of the case being tried”); State v. Romero, 81 P.3d 714 (Or. 
2003) (holding that trial court should have permitted defendant’s expert to testify regarding her suggestibility and 
the risk that she confessed involuntarily and inaccurately and that proposed testimony would not have commented 
improperly on defendant’s credibility); Commonwealth v. Jones, 327 A.2d 10, 13 (Pa. 1974) (holding that trial court 
should have permitted defendant’s expert to testify concerning defendant’s mental capacity, I.Q. and lack of verbal 
ability to help the jury determine whether the confession introduced by the prosecution was valid); see).  See also 
United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 15-17 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that trial court committed error by 
refusing to allow defendant’s expert to testify to defendant’s mental condition, which was characterized by 
exaggeration and verbosity, to help the jury understand defendant’s statements in tape recorded conversations).  
187 557 S.E.2d 205 (Va. 2002). 
188 See Pritchett, 557 S.E.2d at 207.  See also People v. Slago, 374 N.E.2d 1270 (Ill. App. 1978) (holding trial court 
properly excluded defendant’s expert testimony explaining why he might have confessed falsely and discussing 
limits on admissibility of such testimony). 
189 See Pritchett, 557 S.E.2d at 207. 
190 237 F.3d 1008, (9th Cir. 2001). 
191 Vallejo, 237 F.3d at 119-20.   
192 See, e.g., United States v. Antone, 981 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing expert to explain general 
characteristics of abused children); Commonwealth v. Federico, 683 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Mass. 1997) (deciding 
qualified experts may testify as to general behavior patterns of sexually abused children; this testimony aids jury’s 
fact-finding and provides information generally beyond  scope of common knowledge); Harris v. State, 84 P.3d 731, 
748 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (holding in spousal abuse case, it is not improper bolstering of witness credibility for 
an expert to testify as to the general characteristics of battered spouses.); Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725, 
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much bolster the witness’s credibility as dispel the false impression possibly created by the 
relevant behavior. 193 The testimony shores up the credibility of the witness by supporting the 
witness’s factual account; the expert testimony does not focus either on the witness’s truthfulness 
or on memory or perception per se.194 
Conversely, the expert may provide insight into conduct and thereby cast doubt on the 
witness’s credibility.  For example, an expert may testify that the alleged victim has not 
manifested the types of behavior typical of abuse victims.195 An expert may also be called on to 
explain the possibility that a child testifying to abuse may be responding to adult manipulation, 
helping the jury to understand otherwise inexplicable accusations and testimony.196 In these 
cases, the expert provides insight into patterns of behavior that will help the jury evaluate the 
credibility of the witness’s account.197 Because the jury may believe that actions speak louder 
than words, it is critical that the jury understand the message sent by the witness’s actions.   
 Despite the assistance provided by expert testimony explaining witness behavior, courts 
sometimes dismiss expert testimony bearing on behavior as improper expert comment on 
credibility, characterizing expert testimony that merely explains behavior as improper bolstering.  
In Commonwealth v. Gallagher, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
testimony of a prosecution expert who explained the effect of rape trauma syndrome on the 
 
731-32 (Pa. 1992) (rejecting prosecution’s argument that expert testimony was merely vouching for the defendant’s 
credibility and holding that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding the expert testimony that would 
have explained the impact of the abusive home environment on the defendant and supported claim of self-defense by 
explaining “battered person syndrome” to the jury); Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1220 (holding that expert did not cross 
the line by testifying not only to the typical behavior of young victims of sexual abuse but also to the fact that the 
victim’s behavior fit the typical pattern); State v. Myles, 887 So. 2d 118, 125 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (declaring this 
type of testimony helpful as long as it “explain[s] in general the behavioral characteristics of child abuse victims in 
disclosing alleged incidents without giving an opinion directly concerning the particular victim's credibility.”); State 
v. Proffitt, 596 N.E.2d 527, 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (allowing objective medical evidence showing injuries 
consistent with abuse to be admitted as testimony did not assert victim must be believed).  See also Imwinkelried, 
Federal Rule of Evidence, supra note 13, at 147 (discussing use of experts to bolster victims of child abuse). 
193 See, e.g., United States v. Bighead 128 F.3d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that expert testimony 
describing behavior of sexual abuse victims was properly admitted); Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Ala. 
1989) (holding that expert was properly permitted to testify concerning behavior of teenage victims of sexual abuse 
to explain delay in reporting and recantation); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn.1984) (holding expert 
could properly describe characteristics or traits she typically observed in sexually abused children because 
“the sexual abuse of children places lay jurors at a disadvantage.”); State v. Neswood, 51 P.2d 1159, 1162 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2002) (describing as permissible expert testimony listing reasons why victim of child abuse would recant); see 
also United States v. Cox, 23 M.J. 808, 815 (1986) (recognizing the role of rape trauma syndrome testimony in 
explaining the victim's reaction to the fact finders). 
194 See, e.g., State v. Folse, 623 So. 2d 59, 68 (La. 1993) (noting that defense corrected improper expert testimony by 
clarifying on cross-examination that the expert could only say that the witness’ account was “consistent with the 
dynamics of sexual abuse”); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219 435 (Or. 1983) (noting that “if the jurors 
believed the experts’ testimony, they would be more likely to believe the victims’ accounts” but also that “[n]either 
of the experts directly expressed an opinion on the truth of the victim’s testimony”). 
195 See, e.g., State v. White, 943 P.2d 544, 546 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding trial court committed error by 
excluding testimony concerning lack of symptoms). 
196 See generally Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (discussing admissibility of manipulation 
testimony). 
197 See State v. Remme, 23 P.3d 374, 382-83 (Or. 2001) (holding that expert testimony related to the behavior of 
abuse victim was properly admitted); see also State v. Keller, 844 P.2d 195, 198 (Or. 1993) (concluding that expert 
could fairly testify to what types of behavior might indicate leading and coaching young children, but holding that 
the witness crossed the line into improper assessment of specific credibility).  In Remme, the Court attempted to 
reconcile Oregon decisions related to expert testimony concerning abuse victims and suggested that the line falls 
between testimony that assists the jury in its assessment of credibility and that which supplants that assessment. 
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victims of rape impermissibly intruded on the province of the jury to determine credibility.198 
The court described the testimony: 
The crux of the testimony appears to be that the victim’s failure to identify the appellant two 
weeks after the rape is unremarkable, as she was in the acute phase of RTS in which a victim has 
difficulty performing even normal functions, and the in-court identification five years later is 
particularly credible, as it results from a flashback with the mind operating like a computer.  It is 
clear that the only purpose of the expert testimony was to enhance the credibility of the victim. 
199 
This holding bears the mark of the common law maxim leading the court to exclude helpful 
expert testimony out of excessive concern for the jury’s role in assessing credibility. 
Like expert testimony concerning perception, memory, and bias, expert testimony 
helping the jury understand behavior can improve the jury’s assessment of credibility.  The mere 
fact that the expert’s testimony will support the witness’s account of the facts should not lead to 
its exclusion.  Instead, recognizing the utility of the expert in helping the jury understand the 
witness’s otherwise inexplicable behavior, the courts should allow the testimony. 
 
C. Expert Testimony Expressing an Opinion Consistent or Inconsistent with a Witness’s 
Testimony 
 
In some cases, the expert bolsters the witness merely by expressing an opinion that 
dovetails with the witness’s testimony or, conversely, impeaches a witness by expressing a 
contrary view of the facts.  Such expert testimony should not be precluded or even scrutinized as 
improper comment on credibility.  Instead, it bolsters or impeaches only to the extent that any 
evidence tends to strengthen or diminish the force of other consistent evidence. 
 Such evidence is nevertheless sometimes targeted as improper bolstering.  For example, 
in State v. Mackey, the defendant, who contended that the agent who had investigated him for 
drug offenses had conducted himself improperly, offered an expert in law enforcement 
techniques to describe the protocol for investigating drug trafficking.200 The evidence could 
have helped the jury to assess the account of the prosecution’s chief witness, a retired police 
officer, that he purchased drugs from the defendant without following many normal police 
procedures.  The court excluded the evidence because it viewed the proffered testimony as 
 
198 547 A.2d 355, 356-357 (Pa. 1988).  
199 547 A.2d at 358 (emphasis in original).  See also Seese, 517 A.2d at 921 (holding that allowing an expert to 
testify concerning the behavior of child abuse victims, stating in particular that they do not have sufficient 
knowledge to fabricate the details of sexual encounters invaded the province of the jury even though the expert did 
not specifically address the credibility of the witness in the case); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830,  837-38 
(Pa. 1992) (holding that prosecution expert should not have been permitted to testify to reasons sexually abused 
child might not come forward and might omit details of the incident because “it would infringe on the jury’s right to 
determine credibility”); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 956 (Pa. Super. 1991) (holding trial court should 
not have admitted expert testimony concerning behavior of child abuse victims because it infringed on jury’s 
function).  In Dunkle, Justice McDermott, writing separately, criticized the majority for “ascribing to the average 
juror incredible sophistication regarding the effect of sexual abuse on the workings of a young mind” and 
“trivial[izing] an entire field of child psychology by implying that everybody already knows these facts.”  602 A.2d 
at 839-40.  But see Commonwealth v. Cepull, 568 A.2d 247, 248-49 (Pa. Super. 1990) (concluding that expert could 
properly give “generalized description of rape trauma syndrome” although expert should not have been permitted to 
testify concerning studies concluding that “victims of rape lie in only three percent of the cases”). 
200 535 S.E.2d 555 (N.C. 2000). 
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improperly commenting on the credibility of the prosecution witness.201 In fact, the expert’s 
testimony would not have addressed the witness’s credibility per se.  Instead, it would simply 
have given the jury a standard against which to judge the way in which the witness claimed to 
have conducted his investigation of the defendant. 
In State v. O’Hanlan, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the distinction 
between comment on credibility and testimony that merely supports one party’s version of the 
facts.202 The defendant objected to the testimony of the emergency room physician who had 
examined the victim of the alleged rape on the ground the expert impermissibly bolstered her 
credibility.203 The expert testified, based on his observation of her physical and emotional 
condition and on her statements, that the victim’s “emotional state was consistent with having 
been assaulted,” that “it seemed pretty clear that there had been some type of assault,” and that 
“her emotional state was consistent with a very severe and significant assault.”204 None of this 
testimony was specifically directed at assisting the jury to assess the victim’s credibility.  
Instead, the expert’s diagnosis acted as independent evidence of the offense.205 As the court 
pointed out, any bolstering was “incidental” to the expert’s testimony.206  
That the maxim is even invoked in these situations demonstrates the breadth of its reach.  
Expert testimony will often have an incidental impact on credibility assessments, either 
bolstering or undermining the jury’s belief of other testimony.  That incidental impact should 
have no bearing on the admissibility of the expert testimony. 
VI. TIMING QUESTIONS: MAY EXPERT TESTIMONY SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY PRECEDE 
AN ATTACK ON CREDIBILITY?
Regardless of the role played by expert testimony that bolsters credibility, courts often 
raise a question concerning whether the bolstering testimony may be admitted before the 
witness’s credibility has been attacked.207 At common law, the courts espoused a rule 
prohibiting bolstering except in response to an attack on the witness and often stated the rule 
 
201 See 535 S.E.2d at 558-59.  There may have been other reasons for excluding the evidence; its probative value in 
the case was questionable. 
202 570 S.E.2d 751, 756 (N.C. 2002).  See also Waters v. Kassulke, 916 F.2d 329, 331-32 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that 
expert could properly testify that “based on his physical and oral examinations of the girls, in his opinion, were 
victims of sexual abuse”); Harris v. State, 631 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. App. 2006) (allowing expert to testify that tests 
conducted yielded results consistent with sexual molestation); Williams v. State, 597 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ga. App. 
2004) (same). 
203 570 S.E.2d at 757.  
204 O’Hanlan, 570 S.E.2d at 756.  
205 See O’Hanlan, 570 S.E.2d at 756; see also United States v. Kearns, 61 F.3d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
argument that DEA agent who testified concerning certain aspects of drug trafficking improperly vouched for the 
prosecution’s informant witness because he did not “place the prestige of the government behind the witness;” he 
did not mention her or claim any knowledge of the specific case); United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 419-20 
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that trial court properly permitted expert to testify concerning behavior of abused children 
as well as behavior he observed in alleged victim-witness).   
206 O’Hanlan, 570 S.E.2d at 758.  See also State v. McDavid, 594 So. 2d 12, 16 (Miss. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that certain evidence should have been excluded as bolstering and noting that “such evidence, if otherwise 
admissible, would not be inadmissible simply because it corroborated her testimony”). 
207 See, e.g., Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 885, 895 (Miss. 2006) (“It is of course the rule in virtually all jurisdictions 
that a witness's unimpeached or unquestioned credibility may not be bolstered by any means, including references to 
polygraphic evidence.”); Berger, supra note 7, at 612-13 (stating as a general rule that an attack must precede 
bolstering).   
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broadly.208 The rationale rested in part on a desire not to waste time on bolstering if the 
witness’s credibility was not going to be attacked.209 The courts should not import that 
overbroad prohibition on bolstering evidence into modern jurisprudence.  Instead, the timing 
requirement should be enforced only when the expert testimony is offered only to establish the 
witness’s truthful character and not when it bolsters the witness’s credibility in some other way. 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence contain no general rule against bolstering prior to 
attack.210 Only two rules specifically address bolstering.  Rule 608(a) precludes bolstering with 
evidence of truthful character before the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.  
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) allows prior consistent statements to be admitted to prove the truth of the 
assertions they contain only to rebut specific types of attack, such as a claim of improper motive 
or recent fabrication.211 The absence of any other language addressing the question of bolstering 
before attack suggests that there is no general timing requirement.  Interestingly, an examination 
of the decisions that state a prohibition on bolstering before attack also reveals that the 
prohibition developed as a limitation on only these two types of bolstering.212 
Despite the absence of clear authority governing the timing of non-character bolstering 
evidence, some courts have imposed such a requirement.213 In United States v. Awkard, for 
example, the court stated that the Rules of Evidence preclude bolstering until a witness’s 
credibility has been attacked, pointing to Rules 801(d) (1) (B) and 608(a).  The court concluded 
that “[s]imilar considerations must govern the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion” concerning 
whether to permit the government to present an expert to testify concerning hypnosis and the 
ability of a hypnotized witness to recall the events.”214 It was therefore error to permit bolstering 
 
208 Conway v. State, 26 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894) (” No principle in the law of evidence is better settled 
than the one enunciated in the rule that testimony in chief of any kind, tending merely to support the credit of the 
witness, is not to be heard except in reply to some matter previously given in evidence by the opposite party to 
impeach it.”); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 349 (C.C. Me. 1858) (addressing prior consistent statements); 
Jackson, ex. dem. the People, v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314 (NY 1826) (bolstering allowed only after attack on general 
character or claim of inconsistency).  See also Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes, supra note 19, at 1018. 
209 Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes, supra note 19, at 1019. 
210 Imwinkelried, The Silence Speaks Volumes, supra note 19, at 1020.  Some jurisdictions have rules that appear to 
apply more broadly.  See, e.g., Louisiana Evidence Code Art. 607 (4th ed.) (providing that “the credibility of a 
witness may not be supported unless it has been attacked”).   
211 The admissibility of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence is limited by Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to 
situations in which the prior statement rebuts specific types of attack on the witness’ credibility.  See Tome v. United 
States, 513 U.S. 150, 155-56 (1995) (discussing law governing prior consistent statements). 
212 See, e.g., Conway v. State, 26 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).(addressing prior consistent statement); 
United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 349 (C.C. Me. 1858) (addressing prior consistent statements); Jackson, ex. dem. 
the People, v. Etz, 5 Cow. 314 (NY 1826) (bolstering allowed only after attack on general character or claim of 
inconsistency).  
213 See, e.g., State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Me. 1988) (recognizing timing rule).  In Black, the trial court 
permitted a prosecution expert to “to explain to the jury the reason for timing and sequencing inconsistencies in [the 
alleged sexual assault victim]'s testimony.”  537 A.2d at 1156.  The Maine Supreme Court concluded that such 
testimony could be introduced only to rebut an attack on the witness, noting its concern that expert testimony that 
bolsters a witness’ credibility by explaining the witness’ conduct “can have a profound effect on the outcome of the 
trial.” 537 A.2d at 1156.  The court held that the defense cross-examination opened the door to the expert’s 
explanation of the witness’ apparent inconsistency and that the trial court therefore had discretion to admit the 
expert’s testimony before the attack.  But see Crawford, 718 A.2d at 206 (reasoning that trial court properly 
excluded testimony of defendant’s expert on repressed memory because the prosecution had not offered expert 
testimony in support of repressed memory; apparently assuming that bolstering not only could but must precede the 
particular attack on credibility). 
214 597 F.2d at 670.  
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testimony where defense counsel made it clear that the defense would not cross-examine the 
expert to raise questions about the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony.215 
The courts should not apply a blanket rule requiring an attack on credibility to precede 
bolstering testimony except when the testimony falls within Rule 608 and is thus clearly subject 
to a timing requirement.  Even if a witness’s ability to perceive or remember has not been 
specifically attacked, expert testimony addressing specific aspects of perception or memory may 
be helpful to the jury.  For example, where a complaining witness suffers from mental or 
physical impairments that make it difficult to testify, the prosecution should be permitted to 
anticipate the jury’s concerns and present expert testimony explaining the witness’s competence 
even if the witness’s credibility has not been attacked.216 Similarly, even in the absence of a 
pointed attack, an expert may help the jury view a witness’s behavior in ways that bolster the 
credibility of the witness’s testimony.  Even if the defense does not argue to the jury that the 
complainant in a domestic violence case was slow to report the defendant’s conduct, an expert on 
the behavior of battered women may help the jury place the testimony in context and overcome 
jurors’ preconceived notions of logical behavior.217 
Even if there is no per se rule precluding this expert testimony prior to an attack on the 
witness’s credibility, it may be relevant as the court applies the rules of evidence.  Whether the 
witness’s credibility has been attacked may be a decisive factor as the court applies Rule 403 to 
evidence bolstering credibility.  Under Rule 403, the court must determine whether the negative 
characteristics of the offered evidence substantially outweigh its probative value.  Expert 
testimony explaining conduct or addressing perception or memory has greater probative value in 
the case if the witness’s credibility has been attacked on that basis.218 That is, if the defendant 
 
215 See Awkard, 597 F.2d at 670. 
216 See, e.g., People v. Acklin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (discussing admissibility of school 
psychologist’s testimony to explain complaining witness’ infirmities to the jury). 
217 See Carol Jacobsen et. al, Battered Women, Homicide Convictions, and Sentencing: The Case For Clemency, 18 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 39 (2007) (discussing history of expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome in 
Michigan); Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of “Ideal Victims”: Assaulted Women’s 
“Image Problems” In Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 120-24 (broadly discussing effects of battered spouse 
syndrome); H. Morley Swingle et al., Unhappy Families: Prosecuting and Defending Domestic Violence Cases, 58 
J. MO. B. 220, 226 (.2002) (highlighting development of battered spouse testimony in Missouri Domestic abuse 
cases); Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: Prosecution Use of 
Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593, 603-05 (1999) (describing evolution of expert 
testimony regarding battered women); see also Jay B. Rosman, The Battered Woman Syndrome in Florida: Junk 
Science or Admissible Evidence?, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 807, 842 -843 (2003) (criticizing recent Florida case 
excluding battered spouse testimony in sexual assault case). 
218 See State v. Bowman, 352 S.E.2d 437, 440 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Doctor’s] testimony concerning delay in a 
child's reporting sexual abuse cases was used to corroborate victim's credibility after defendant's cross-examination 
attacked her credibility and therefore was properly admitted.”); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 254 (Ariz. 1984) 
(“Defendant claimed that the victim's accusations were prompted by anger over discipline imposed by her parents. 
Testimony providing the jury with an alternative explanation for the victim's anger was admissible to assist the jury 
in determining what had motivated the initial charges against defendant.”); Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 71-73 
(Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (discussing opening the door to expert testimony concerning credibility); Michael J. Grills, 
Comment, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Colorado: Broadening Admissibility to Address the 
Question of Consent in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 834 (1990) (evaluating usefulness of 
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome in helping jury understand to combat prejudicial effect of defendant 
statements); Patricia A. Korey, Evidence – Rehabilitative Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Shuts the Door on Effective Prosecutions – Commonwealth v. Dunkle,  66 TEMP. L. 
REV. 589 604-605 (1992) (explaining importance of allowing expert to counteract defendant assertions of delay in 
reporting child abuse); John E. B. Myers, Jan Bays, Judith Becker, Lucy Berliner, David L. Corwin & Karen J. 
Saywitz, Expert Testimony in Child Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 83 (1989) (“Properly qualified experts can 
Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?  
41
has suggested in cross-examination or in some other way implied that a sexual assault did not 
occur because the complaining witness failed to report it promptly, then expert testimony 
informing the jury that such behavior is common among victims and explaining why is 
particularly helpful; the testimony has greater probative value than if the defendant had not 
raised that issue.   
 
VII. THE RULES ON EXPERT TESTIMONY AS BARRIERS TO TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
CREDIBILITY 
Of course, to be admissible, expert testimony must satisfy the requirements of the rules 
governing all expert testimony.219 The witness must be qualified as an expert.220 The expert’s 
testimony must meet the reliability criteria of Rule 702.221 The testimony must be relevant and 
must fit the facts of the case.222 It must assist the jury.223 Finally, the basis of the expert’s 
opinion must be acceptable under Rule 703.224 
assist jurors in sifting through the mountain of complex and sometimes conflicting and counterintuitive information 
presented in many child sexual abuse cases. “); Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Admissibility of expert testimony concerning 
domestic-violence syndromes to assist jury in evaluating victim's testimony or behavior, 57 A.L.R.5th 315 (1998);  
see also Berger, supra note 7, at 615. 
219 A thorough discussion of the expert testimony rules as they relate to discussions of credibility is beyond the 
scope of this article.  For a thorough consideration of that topic, see Berger, supra note 7. 
220 See FED. R. EVID. 702.  
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
Id.; see also Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The witness’ qualifications to render an expert 
opinion are also liberally judged by Rule 702. Inasmuch as the rule uses the disjunctive, a person may qualify to 
render expert testimony in any one of the five ways listed: knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”); 
Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176-177 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A witness therefore can 
qualify as an expert even though he lacks practical experience, provided that he has received suitable training or 
education or has otherwise gained the requisite knowledge or skill. Thus, although the absence of hands-on 
experience is certainly relevant to the determination whether to accept a witness as an expert, it is not 
determinative.”); 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, at § 6265 (“While Rule 702 does not define the meaning of 
the terms used to describe the bases for expert qualification, the courts have given them common sense 
interpretations. ‘Education’ sufficient to qualify an expert may be formal, resulting in a degree or certification. 
‘Education’ also may be based on informal self-study or independent research.  ‘Training’ usually means on the job 
instruction or work-related classes.  ‘Skill’ is a specialized aptitude developed as a result of significant involvement 
with a specific subject. ‘Experience’ may qualify a witness as an expert so long as it is obtained in a practical 
context. This means that experience developed as a professional expert witness is not sufficient.”).  
221 See FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.137, 152 (1999) (“[the reliability standard is 
designed] to make certain an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, 
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field.”); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (identifying factors helping in 
evaluation of reliability including, whether the technique can be and was tested, whether it was subjected to peer 
review, whether there is a high known or potential rate of error, whether there are controlling standards and whether 
there is general acceptance of the technique); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1985) (examining 
reliability of expert’s novel techniques); United States v. McFillin, 713 F.2d 57 (4th  Cir. 1981) (allowing expert to 
testify after determining technique used rested upon well-established scientific principles); United States v. Havvard, 
117 F.Supp.2d 848, 850 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (evaluating reliability of latent fingerprinting techniques).  
222 See FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Relevant 
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .  The trial court 
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In some cases, a party offers expert testimony relating to credibility that clearly fails to 
satisfy the rules governing expert testimony.225 In those cases, the evidence is properly 
excluded.  In other cases, however, the courts apply unduly restrictive rules to expert testimony 
related to credibility.226 First, courts dismiss such testimony as unhelpful, hastily asserting that 
 
must look at the logical relationship between the evidence proffered and the material issue that evidence is supposed 
to support to determine if it advances the purpose of aiding the trier of fact. Even if an expert's proffered evidence is 
scientifically valid and follows appropriately reliable methodologies, it might not have sufficient bearing on the 
issue at hand to warrant a determination that it has relevant 'fit.' Id. Testimony concerning the laws of quantum 
mechanics may be scientifically relevant, but may have no practical relevance to testimony concerning the function 
and possible failure of a water heater safety valve control. Evidence appropriate for one purpose, therefore, may not 
be relevant for a different purpose, and it is the trial court's task to make this fitness determination.”); United States 
v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.1985) (“An additional consideration under Rule 702--and another aspect 
of relevancy--is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will 
aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute”) 
223 See FED. R. EVID. 702; see also United States v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1266-1267 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding 
expert opinion meets Rule 702 requirements where trier of fact “might not otherwise be capable of interpreting 
[evidence] easily and correctly”); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Under that 
requirement that expert testimony "assist" the jury (usually referred to as the "helpfulness" requirement), testimony 
should ordinarily not extend to matters within the knowledge of laymen.”); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding under Rule 702, “an expert can be employed if his testimony will be helpful to 
the trier of fact in understanding evidence that is simply difficult, [even if] not beyond ordinary understanding.”); 3 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 702:4 (explaining “assist trier of fact” requirement); 29 WRIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 26, at § 6264  n. 10 (“expert testimony should not be excluded unless the jury is as competent as 
the expert.”) 
224 See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not 
be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative 
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (“Unlike an ordinary witness, see 
Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on first-hand 
knowledge or observation.”); Mendes-Silva v. U.S., 980 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Rule 703 serves the 
two-fold purpose of broadening the acceptable bases for expert testimony, by allowing testimony based on hearsay 
or otherwise inadmissible evidence, and avoiding the time-consuming process of introducing the mass of evidence 
that forms the basis of an expert opinion.”); 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, at § 6273 (“Rule 703 permits an 
expert to base opinion testimony on three possible sources--personal knowledge, evidence admitted at trial, or 
evidence not admitted but "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.”). 
225 See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261 (10th Cir. 1999) (criticizing trial court for failing to 
make a reliability determination before permitting an expert to give unqualified opinion that alleged victims had 
been sexually abused); United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony of defense 
“expert” whose qualifications were never established and who provided no information relating to the basis for his 
conclusions); People v. Randall, 845 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Ill. App. 2006) (holding trial court properly excluded 
testimony of defense expert which was speculative and had a questionable basis and also remarking that the 
testimony would have “invaded that province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses”).  See also 2 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 608.1, 130 n. 3 (5th Ed. 2001) (citing Cecil and explaining 
proposition that expert testimony addressing credibility is not admissible).  
226 See generally Simmons, supra note 7, at 1047-53 (discussing courts’ implementation of the requirement that the 
evidence assist the jury); Berger, supra note 7.  See, e.g., United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(reporting that trial court based exclusion of defense expert on eyewitness identification in part on the fact that the 
expert had never “studied any victim or eyewitness of a bank robbery”); Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d at 50 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (reporting that trial court excluded as within knowledge of jury); United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 
1265-67 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that expert testimony based on victim’s statements impermissibily vouched 
for victim’s credibility); Nichols v. American National Insurance Co., 154 F.3d 875, 883 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
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the jury needs no help on credibility questions.  Second, courts impose overly restrictive basis 
requirements, rejecting expert testimony that relies on taking a particular view of disputed facts.  
A. The Requirement that the Testimony Assist the Jury 
Resisting the admissibility of expert testimony related to credibility, courts invoke the 
maxim that the jury can determine the reliability of the statements without the help of expert 
testimony and accordingly conclude that the expert’s testimony will not assist the jury as 
required by Rule 702.227 The Advisory Committee emphasized the importance of using expert 
testimony to help the jury and rejected the notion that an expert would usurp the province of the 
jury as “empty rhetoric.”228 The rules liberalized admissibility, abandoning the common law rule 
that admitted expert testimony only when it was necessary to the jury’s deliberations.229 Instead, 
the rules invite courts to admit expert testimony whenever it would help shed light on the 
questions before the jury.230 
expert testimony as not helpful); United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir.1989) (excluding expert testimony 
as unhelpful); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48, 52 (Haw. 1990) (dismissing expert testimony as impermissible 
bolstering in child sexual abuse case); People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 407-08 (opining that underlying purpose 
of psychological expert testimony was to enhance credibility of victim) (Mich.1990); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 
1157 & n. 1 (Me.1988) (rejecting expert testimony that witness’ behavior was consistent with victim of child abuse) 
; State v. Bressman, 689 P.2d 901, 907-08 (Kan.1984) (holding expert testimony regarding behavior of alleged rape 
victim impermissibly passed on credibility of allegations); Commonwealth v. Colin C., 643 N.E.2d 19, 22- 23 
(Mass.1994) (explaining that expert testimonty that alleged victims were sexually abused “was tantamount to an 
expert opinion that the children's claims of sexual abuse were likely true”); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766, 768, 771-
72 (explaining danger inherent in expert testimony about behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims) 
(Vt.1990); Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990) (doubting scientific validity of expert 
testimony concerning “child sexual abuse profile”); State v. Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. App. 1984) 
(remarking that “aura of scientific reliability” surrounding psychological credibility assessment took ultimate issue 
of guilt away from jury); Johnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ark.1987) (noting that “lay jurors were jurors were 
fully competent to determine whether the history given by the victim was consistent with sexual abuse.”); State v. 
Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 140-41 (Utah 1994) (affirming lower court’s refusal to allow expert testimony the defendant 
did not match psychological profile of a pedophile); State v. Lucero, 863 P.2d 1071, 1075 (N.M.1993) (explaining 
that “[d]etermining the complainant's credibility or truthfulness is not a function for an expert in a trial setting, but 
rather is an issue reserved for the jury.”). 
227 See generally Friedland, supra note 11, at 191-92.  
228 FED. R. EVID. 704, advisory committee’s notes (quoting Wigmore); see also FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory 
committee’s notes: 
The fundamental question that a court must answer . . . is “‘whether the untrained layman would be qualified to 
determine intelligently and to the best degree, the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a 
specialized understanding of the subject matter involved.’”  
See also Berger, supra note 7, at 593-604 (discussing this requirement as applied to testimony touching on 
credibility).  See also Shay 57 F.3d at 173; United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(holding that trial court improperly excluded defendant’s expert testimony describing his mental condition which 
manifested itself in verbosity and exaggeration; the testimony was necessary to help the jury assess the defendant’s 
statements in recorded conversations introduced by the prosecution and was particularly important because the 
defendant was incompetent to testify, so the jury had no opportunity to judge his demeanor).  In Shay the court 
quoted the Advisory Committee and then went on to explain why expert testimony relating to the defendant’s mental 
condition may have been admissible and remanded for determination of the question.  57 F.3d at 134.  
229 See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1049-50 (discussing change in law on this question). 
230 See Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1219 (detailing “assist the jury” standard); United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 
969 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding necessity is not a condition precedent for the admissibility of expert opinion testimony; 
rather, the test is whether the opinion will assist the trier of fact); Gherasim, 985 P.2d at 1272 (holding evidence 
need only be helpful to be admitted and that the trial court had applied too demanding a standard); Breidor v. Sears, 
Roebuck and Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Helpfulness is the touchstone of Rule 702.”); PAUL F. 
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In United States v. Hall,231 the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the trial court had applied 
an inordinately demanding standard to the proffered defense expert’s testimony.  The court 
pointed out that the trial court may admit expert testimony even if it “covers matters that are 
within the average juror’s comprehension.” 
Nevertheless, some courts view credibility issues as uniquely within the jury’s province 
and therefore off limits to expert testimony, opining that common knowledge is all that is 
required to assess  credibility.232 In Washington v. Schriver, for example, the trial court excluded 
the defendant’s expert testimony concerning the suggestibility of child witnesses, reasoning that 
it is “well within the knowledge of the average juror” and it is “soft scientific testimony at best,” 
as well as that it represented improper comment on the witness’s credibility.233 Thus the court 
erected barriers to the evidence under the rules on expert testimony.234 
Even after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts continue to cite 
restrictive pre-rule authority to support rulings excluding expert testimony related to credibility.  
Courts frequently cite United States v. Barnard, a 1973 Ninth Circuit decision.235 In Barnard,
the defense offered expert testimony that a prosecution witness trial court excluded testimony of 
defense experts.  Proffered testimony was based on review of the prosecution witness’ “was a 
sociopath who would lie when it was to his advantage to do so.”236 Concluding that the defense 
expert testimony was properly excluded, the Ninth Circuit characterized the jury as “the lie 
detector of the courtroom” and held that the testimony would not have been helpful to the jury.  
The court further opined that this type of testimony should be admitted only in “unusual cases, 
such as United States v. Hiss.” Invoking this authority, courts continue to treat the jury as a lie 
detector requiring no help from expert witnesses. 
ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 702 (3d ed. 2006) (“The common law viewed expert testimony 
with a somewhat jaundiced eye. Although ‘progressive’ courts began to liberalize the standards, in its purest form 
the common law was quite restrictive on a number of levels. (a) It confined experts to those with extensive formal 
learning. (b) They were allowed to testify only in areas totally beyond lay ken. (c) They had to base their testimony 
only on admissible, admitted evidence, (d) presented to them in an open court ‘hypothetical question’ that had to (e) 
stick scrupulously to proven facts, (f) and had to include substantially all the pertinent facts. (g) Neither experts nor 
lay witnesses could testify to an ultimate issue in the case, and (h) expert conclusions had to be based "on a 
reasonable degree of professional probability or certainty, not just possibility.”); 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, 
at § 6265 (“Expert testimony was admissible under prerules common law only where the subject of that testimony 
was beyond the experience or knowledge of ordinarily lay people and would provide ‘appreciable help’ to the trier 
of fact.”); Simmons, supra note 7, at 1049-50 (discussing requirement); Berger, supra note 7, at 593-95; Nossel, 
supra note 26, at 234.  A trial court’s assessment that expert testimony is unhelpful may be reversed as an abuse of 
discretion.  See, e.g., State v. White, 943 P.2d 544, 547 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).  
231 93 F.3d 1337, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1996). 
232 Nichols v. American National Insurance Co., 883 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting expert testimony as not helpful 
because credibility questions are within the jury’s competence and exclusive function); United States v. Hudson, 884 
F.2d 1016 (7th Cir.1989) (excluding expert on eyewitness testimony as unhelpful since testimony was well within 
jury’s understanding).  See generally Simmons, supra note 7, at 1050-52 (discussing cases); Friedland, supra note 
11, at 169. 
233 255 F.3d at 50 (2d Cir. 2001). 
234 See also United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132-33 (reserving judgment on the question of whether expert 
opinion on truthfulness can be excluded as unhelpful even though it satisfies the other requirements of Rule 702). 
235 Unites States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir.1973).  Westlaw reports numerous cases citing Barnard.
See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Barnard to support conclusion that 
psychiatric testimony concerning credibility would not be admissible); Bastow v. General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 
506, 511 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Barnard in support of decision to excluded testimony); State v. Israel, 963 P.2d 897 
(Wash. App. 1998) (citing Barnard to support exclusion of expert testimony bearing on truthfulness). 
236 F.2d 907 at 912.  The expert based the opinion on a review of the witness’ Army psychiatric evaluation, his grand 
jury testimony and courtroom observation of the witness.  F.2d 907 at 912. 
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Instead of enforcing such a demanding standard, the courts should recognize that jurors 
are not well equipped to assess credibility.  Rather than excluding expert testimony addressing 
witness credibility, the courts should welcome the assistance it offers to the jury.237 
B. The Basis of Expert Opinion  
 
Another way in which courts restrict expert testimony concerning credibility is to enforce 
overly stringent basis requirements.  In their effort to protect the province of the jury, courts 
sometimes exclude expert testimony related to credibility on the ground that it rests on the 
truthfulness of the witness’s account.  That represents an unduly stringent basis requirement. 
 The law has long allowed expert opinion to be based on one party’s view of the disputed 
facts in the case.  Before the modernization of the rules governing expert testimony, there were 
two ways to provide the facts that formed the basis of the expert’s opinion: the expert could sit 
through the entire trial and base the opinion on the evidence presented or the attorney would ask 
a hypothetical question, building into the question the version of the facts espoused by that 
party.238 In either situation, the opinion would rest on one version of the facts rather than 
conflicting versions.  The modern rules permit experts to base their testimony and opinions not 
only on evidence admitted in the trial but also on materials that are not admitted into evidence 
and even on unadmitted information, provided it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the same field.239 Regardless of which approach the party takes, the expert thus may base her 
conclusions on information contained in the testimony of fact witnesses.240 A disagreement 
about the facts or question about the credibility or accuracy of a witness’ testimony should not 
foreclose the party from presenting an expert opinion that assumes the truthfulness and accuracy 
of the witness’ account.241 
237 See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that expert testimony could 
be helpful “because jurors are at a disadvantage when dealing with sexual abuse of children”). 
238 See KENNETH M. MOGILL, EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES § 6:30 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing expert witness 
examination strategies, including having expert sit-in on trial); THOMAS A. MAUET & WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL 
EVIDENCE § 9.5 (3d ed. 2005) (same); see also Berger, supra note 7, at 569. 
239 See MAUET § 9.5 (discussing basis of expert testimony); Nossel, supra note 26, at 234-353; GRAHAM, FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 703:1 (examining bases for expert opinion testimony); 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 
26, at § 6274 (“Rule 703 permits expert opinion to be based on three possible sources: firsthand knowledge, 
admitted evidence, and facts or data not admitted into evidence if ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject’”); Richard Neumeg, Annotation, What Type of 
Information is “Reasonably Relied Upon by Experts” within Rule 703, Federal Rule of Evidence, Permitting Expert 
Opinion Based on Information not Admissible in Evidence, 49 A.L.R. FED. 363 (1980). 
240 See Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F.Supp. 451, 456-57 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (concluding that trial court erred when 
excluded defendant’s expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome because the expert lacked of personal 
knowledge of key facts and based her conclusions on reports prepared by others and noting that the law is clear that 
an expert does not need personal knowledge of the facts but may rely equally on “the assumed truth of the testimony 
of other witnesses”); State v. White, 943 P.2d 544, 546 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (discounting trial court’s concern that 
expert had not examined victim but was basing opinion on facts testified to by other witnesses).  See generally 
MAUET § 9.5 (noting challenge of establishing basis for expert testimony when testimony is in conflict and noting 
that “[t]he dilemma ordinarily is left for resolution during cross-examination”); Berger, supra note 7, at 565-67; 
Mullane, supra note 32, at 79-81. 
241 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 519 (1943) (rejecting argument that expert should not be permitted to 
base testimony on disputed evidence); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “it is a rare 
case where everything is agreed except the subject matter for which the expert is presented”); Greenwell v. 
Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that expert was not required to take into account eyewitness 
testimony with which he disagreed).  Legitimate expert testimony will sometimes necessarily include assessment of 
or reliance on a witness’ sincerity.  See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 569-72.  In Marine, for example, the court 
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Nevertheless, a number of courts preclude experts from testifying if they base their 
credibility-related opinions on the truth of contested testimony, concluding that such testimony 
invades the province of the jury to determine credibility.242 For example, in United States v. 
Scop, the Second Circuit expressed concern that the expert’s “opinions were based on his 
positive assessment of the trustworthiness and accuracy of the testimony of the government’s 
witnesses.”243 Noting that credibility is a question solely for the jury, the court stated “expert 
witnesses may not offer opinions on relevant events based on their personal assessment of the 
credibility of another witness’s testimony” and concluded that an opinion based on such an 
assessment of credibility would be inadmissible.244 The court went on to clarify its holding in 
light of Rule 703, which permits the expert to rely on facts or data made known to the expert at 
the trial.245 The court explained that the expert is free to rely on the “testimony of a witness 
whose credibility is not in dispute” or “[w]here the credibility of the witness is an issue, the 
expert may assume the truth of his or her trial testimony and thereafter offer an opinion based on 
the substance of the testimony.”246 Thus, Scop seems to require experts (or counsel who is 
conducting the examination) to use careful phrasing when explaining the basis of an expert 
opinion, stating that the truth of certain testimony is assumed, but not that the testimony is true or 
the witness credible.247 
Because courts are resistant to admitting this evidence, the party presenting the expert 
may be wise to sidestep admissibility problems by carefully preparing and examining an expert.  
The party presenting an expert should make sure that the expert has an adequate basis for any 
opinion the party wants the expert to express.  Expert testimony must rest on some basis other 
than mere acceptance of the witness’ account.  If the basis is that limited, no expertise comes into 
play.  For example, in United States v. Whitted, the court also concluded that doctor testifying for 
the prosecution overstepped the permissible limits where the prosecutor had not established the 
 
held the expert’s testimony concerning the honesty of the victim’s statements to her was permissible to explain the 
basis of her expert opinion that the victim suffered from post traumatic stress syndrome disorder.  520 S.E.2d at 68.  
Similarly, in State v. Wise, the court concluded that the expert’s testimony that the victim’s emotions during 
counseling sessions were “genuine” was merely the observation of an expert on a relevant topic – the victim’s 
emotions - not an impermissible comment on credibility.  390 S.E.2d 142, 146 (NC 1990).  See also Skidmore v. 
Precision Printing and Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding expert could properly testify that 
plaintiff’s “symptoms and recollections appeared genuine and that he felt he had not been ‘duped’” to explain his 
opinion that she suffered from post traumatic stress syndrome). 
242 See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261 (10th Cir. 1999); Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-86; United 
States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding defense expert was properly precluded to testifying to 
conclusions based on credibility assessments); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48, 52 (Haw.1990); People v. Beckley, 
456 N.W.2d 391, 407- 08 (Mich. 1990); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 & n. 1 (Me.1988); State v. Bressman, 
689 P.2d 901, 907-08 (Kan.1984); Commonwealth v. Colin C., 643 N.E.2d 19, 22-23 (Mass. 1994); State v. Gokey, 
574 A.2d 766, 768, 771-72 (Vt. 1990); Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990); State v. Haseltine, 
352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. App.1984); Johnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Ark.1987); State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 
138, 140-41 (Utah 1994); State v. Lucero, 863 P.2d 1071, 1075 (N.M.1993).  In Charley, the Tenth Circuit noted 
that “[m]ost courts that have considered the issue have concluded that expert testimony, based on the statements of 
the alleged victim, that sexual abuse in fact occurred is inadmissible.” 189 F.3d at 1261 (citing United States v. 
Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404, 409-10 (C.A.A.F.1998)). 
243 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 1988). 
244 846 F.2d at 142. 
245 See Scop, 846 F.2d at 142. 
246 Scop, 846 F.2d at 143.  See also Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 398 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating 
disapproval of “the practice of expert witnesses basing their conclusions on the in-court testimony of fact witnesses 
out of concern that such expert testimony may improperly bolster the account given by the fact witnesses”). 
247 See also United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345-46 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[i]t is enough if the expert 
makes clear what his opinion is, based on the different possible factual scenarios that might have taken place”). 
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basis for the doctor’s diagnosis of repeated sexual abuse, leaving open the possibility that it 
rested entirely on the victim’s statements, therefore constituting inadmissible assessment of her 
credibility.248 Given the insufficient basis, the doctor’s testimony that sexual abuse had occurred 
amounted to “a thinly veiled way of stating that [the witness] was telling the truth.”249 
The party should construct its examination of the expert to avoid the problem of improper 
basis.  In United States v. Collins, for example, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
the prosecution had improperly bolstered its witnesses where the prosecutor had simply asked its 
expert to assume facts consistent with the prosecution evidence and “to explain the tax 
implications.”250 The witness did not comment on the truthfulness of the witnesses whose 
testimony had established the assumed facts.251 The Sixth Circuit commented that “the 
credibility of the testimony underlying those hypotheticals was not withdrawn from proper 
independent determination by the jury.”252 
Expert testimony that bears on credibility should not be subjected to a higher standard 
than other expert testimony.  Courts should not permit the common law maxim to live on in the 
guise of a rule that deems testimony on credibility unhelpful.  Nor should the courts exclude 
expert testimony relating to a witness’s credibility because it relies on a particular version of the 
facts of the case.  Instead, the courts should be receptive to such expert testimony, but, as 
discussed in the following section, the parties should exercise care to avoid overreaching in their 
presentation of the expert. 
 
VIII. OVERREACHING: IMPROPER EXPERT COMMENT ON SPECIFIC CREDIBILITY IN THE 
CASE 
248 See 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993). The court held that much of the doctor’s testimony was proper: 
In the context of child sexual abuse cases, a qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused 
children and describe the characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.  A doctor who examines the victim may repeat 
the victim's statements identifying the abuser as a family member if the victim was properly motivated to ensure the 
statements' trustworthiness.  A doctor can also summarize the medical evidence and express an opinion that the 
evidence is consistent or inconsistent with the victim's allegations of sexual abuse. 
Id. at 785 (citations omitted). 
 The alternate grounds for the opinion were also insufficient. Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786-87.  The court also 
based its outcome in part on the conclusion that expert testimony that sexual abuse had in fact occurred addressed an 
issue on which expert testimony was not useful and therefore not admissible under Rule 702.  The court noted that 
“jurors are equally capable of considering the evidence and passing on the ultimate issue of sexual abuse.”  Whitted, 
11 F.3d at 785. 
249 Whitted, 11 F.3d at 787.  But see United States v. Wright, 119 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 1997).  In Wright, the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that doctor who testified for the prosecution improperly based his diagnosis on the 
alleged victim’s account of events, where there was no medical evidence of sexual abuse.  However, the testimony 
was sufficiently circumspect to pass muster.  The doctor testified only “that in his opinion the lack of medical 
evidence was not inconsistent with molestation.”  119 F.3d at 635. 
250 78 F.3d 1021, 1037 (6th Cir. 1996). 
251 See Collins, 78 F.3d at 1037.  
252 Collins, 78 F.3d at 1037.  See also United States v. Price, 722 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1983).  In Price, the court 
held that the conviction must be reversed where the prosecution’s expert, an IRS Agent, testified that “he had based 
his computations on the statements of two of the government witnesses and that he believed them.” The court did 
not set out the specific testimony, but it seems clear that the agent could properly have testified to computations 
based on facts contained in the statements of the witnesses and proven at trial.  The jury could then decide whether 
to credit those statements.  If the jurors rejected the statements as unreliable, inaccurate or untruthful, they would 
correspondingly reject the agent’s computations.  Thus, it appears that the error lay entirely in the agent’s gratuitous 
assertion of belief. 
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The utility of expert testimony on credibility may be limited by the litigant’s failure to 
respect the limits imposed on such testimony.  Many of the cases that reject expert testimony 
bearing on credibility reflect overreaching by the party offering the testimony.  Otherwise helpful 
expert testimony will be excluded if the expert’s testimony overreaches.253 If litigants respected 
these limitations, courts might be more receptive to expert testimony assisting the jury to assess 
credibility.254 Correspondingly, if the courts define and enforce rules of admissibility that are not 
influenced by the outdated common law maxim, the parties will be better able to present 
appropriate expert testimony without overreaching. 
The cardinal rule is that even when the expert is properly qualified and has an appropriate 
basis for expressing an opinion, the expert may not opine directly on the truthfulness of the 
witness’ testimony.  In its comments, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
notes: 
[The rules governing expert testimony] stand ready to exclude opinions which would merely tell 
the jury what result to reach . . . .  They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of 
inadequately explored legal criteria.255 
In accord with these comments, courts are uniform in their condemnation of expert testimony 
claiming to know the truthfulness of any witness.256 No witness’ expertise extends to whether 
the witness is telling the truth in the case.257 Nevertheless parties overreach by asking their 
experts to testify concerning whether a witness is believable in the particular case or whether the 
witness’ account of the facts is truthful.258 Such testimony goes far beyond appropriate expert 
 
253 See, e.g., Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 394-98 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding trial court committed error 
by admitting expert testimony regarding “misperception hypothesis” where expert repeatedly asserted that he 
believed the defendant police officers’ account and condemning the testimony as an attempt to “substitute the 
expert’s judgment for the jury’s”). 
254 See, e.g., United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting expert testimony using “inadequately 
explored legal criteria”). 
255 FED. R. EVID. 704, advisory committee’s notes. 
256 See, e.g., Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267 (“expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of 
another witness encroaches upon the jury’s vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations”); Azure,
801 F.2d 336; In re B.J., 735 .E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ill. App. 2000) (noting that expert could have explained problems 
with technique used to question child, but could not assert that the child was not credible); State v. White, 943 P.2d 
544, 546 (N.M. 1997) (noting that opinion concerning victim’s veracity or truthfulness of witness’ account would 
not be admissible); Milbradt, 305 Or. at 629-30 (Or. 1988) (“a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an opinion 
on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth”).  But see Berger, supra note 7, at 610-12 (arguing that court 
emphasized form over content). 
257 See Vest, 116 F.3d 1179 (commenting that “the expert was in no better position than a lay person” to determine 
whether the witnesses had testified truthfully); Benson, 941 F.2d at 604-05 (noting that expert was no more qualified 
than jury to answer questions); Heath, 341 S.E.2d at 343; Shay, 57 F.3d at 131(1st Cir. 1995) (remarking that “an 
expert’s opinion that another witness is lying or telling the truth is ordinarily inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702 
because the opinion exceeds the scope of the expert’s specialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury 
that it should reach a particular conclusion”).  See also Smith v. State, 925 So. 2d 825, 839 (Miss. 2006) (noting that 
“comments about a witness' veracity, i.e. truthfulness, will generally be inadmissible, because of its ‘dubious 
competency’”).  But see Simmons, supra note 7, at 1029 (asserting that “[w]e now have experts who are skilled (or 
at least claim to be skilled) in determining credibility”); Berger, supra note 7, at 620 (arguing that expert with 
adequate basis should be permitting to “make an explicit statement assessing the truthfulness of the [witness]”). 
258 See, e.g., United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 54-56 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that DEA agent testifying as 
prosecution expert strayed from the scope of his expertise when he interpreted conversations based on his 
knowledge of and beliefs concerning the facts of the case rather than his expertise); Vest, 116 F.3d at 1185 (holding 
that prosecution expert should not have been permitted to compare the defendant-doctor’s files with the patient-
witnesses’ statements and determine whether each patient actually had the symptoms the defendant recorded 
because the testimony involved no application of expertise but merely vouched for the witnesses’ credibility); 
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testimony on credibility.  It does not represent either admissible testimony concerning truthful 
character259 or testimony admissible to help the jury assess the witness’ perception and memory 
or understand the witness’ behavior.260 
There is a difference between testifying “I would not believe the witness because she has 
an untruthful character” and testifying “I would not believe the witness because I believe other 
witnesses instead or view the facts of this case differently.”261 The first form of testimony is 
allowed under the character evidence rules, and experts, like other character witnesses, should be 
permitted to express such opinions provided the proper foundation is laid.262 The second form, 
by contrast, constitutes overreaching, not permitted by any rule.  While an expert can, in some 
 
United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1992) (condemning testimony of expert who recapitulated 
prosecution evidence and explained why he believed certain facts to be true); Waters v. Kassulke, 916 F.2d 329 (6th 
Cir. 1990); Williams v. State, 597 S.E.2d 621, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that expert witness should not have 
testified that victim did not seem “coached” and seemed “truthful and honest”); State v. O’Connor, 564 S.E.2d 296 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (plain error to give jury expert’s report that expressed opinion that victim of alleged sexual 
abuse was credible).  In Waters, the expert went one step too far and moved from an explanation of behavior into 
vouching for credibility.  At the defendant’s rape trial, the prosecution expert, a pediatrician, testified:  
[B]ased on his physical and oral examinations of the girls, he believed they had been the victims of sexual abuse. He 
also testified that the girls' behavior was consistent with that of sexually abused children, and that their detailed 
sexual knowledge was greater than one would expect of girls their ages. 
This testimony was properly confined to the expert’s observations and explanation of behavior.  However, he then 
went further and testified, “I assume [R.W.] was telling the truth as far as who she said did it.”  916 F.2d at 331-32. 
259 See Azure, 801 F.2d at 339-40 (concluding that expert’s testimony did not fall within Rule 608(a) because it was 
not limited to an opinion on the witness’ character for truthfulness but “addressed the specific believability and 
truthfulness of [the witness’ story]”).  
260 See Sections V.A and B supra. In addition, it rarely comports with the rules governing expert testimony. United 
States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179 (7th 1997); Benson, 941 F.2d 598.  The evidence is likely to fail to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 702, because the expert is likely to be testifying outside the realm of anything the expert can 
claim as expertise.  In addition, this type of testimony is not likely to assist the jury and may generate problems that 
warrant exclusion under Rule 403.  See generally Berger, supra note 7. 
261 Conversely, there is a difference between testifying that a witness has a truthful character and is therefore 
generally worthy of belief and testifying that the witness is telling the truth in a specific case.  Courts do not always 
recognize that line.  See, e.g., Hobgood v. State, 926 So. 2d 847, 854 (Miss. 2006) (finding no error where expert 
testified that she found the witness “credible;” emphasizing that she “never stated that the victim was telling the 
truth”); Jackson v. State, 743 So. 2d 1008, 1016 (Miss.App. 1999); State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n. 14 (Haw. 
1982).  In Jackson, the defendant challenged the following portion of the expert’s examination, in which the expert 
unambiguously vouched for the credibility of the witness’ account of the alleged sexual abuse: 
During the State's re-direct examination of Dr. Wright, she testified that "ninety percent of the time, you're assuming 
that a child is telling the truth as to sexual abuse." She qualified her testimony by explaining that she would "be 
looking for evidence that it's not the truth." The following re-direct examination ensued:  
Q. Dr. Wright, was that assumption of truth made with [Jane Doe]?  
A. It was.  
Q. And was it ever disprove[d]?  
A. It was never disprove[d].  
The court rejected the challenge, concluding that “[s]uch testimony does not constitute ‘a direct opinion offered by a 
witness in a child sexual abuse case as to the child's veracity.’” Jackson, 743 So. 2d at 1016. 
In Kim, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:  
We see no relevant difference between such opinions and that expressed by Dr. Mann. While his opinion was not 
couched in terms of character, its function and effect were indistinguishable from traditional character evidence: 
calling to the jury's attention “what might be an otherwise unknown (characteristic) of the witness and thus give the 
jury a more adequate basis for judging his testimony.” Essentially, the difference between an opinion as to character 
for truthfulness and an opinion as to the believability of a witness' statements is the difference between “I think X is 
believable” and “X's statement is believable.” We feel the admissibility of either statement should turn not on 
niceties of phraseology but on the probative value of the testimony.  645 P.2d at 1339 n. 14 (citations omitted). 
262 See Section IV supra.
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cases, fairly assess a witness’ general propensity for (un)truthfulness, no expert should be 
permitted to claim knowledge of the witness’ specific (un)truthfulness in the trial. 
In United States v. Azure, a decision frequently cited for the broad maxim that experts 
cannot vouch for credibility, the Eighth Circuit recognized the line between proper and improper 
use of expertise, precluding expert testimony that bolstered the credibility of a witness by 
vouching for the truthfulness of her in court testimony.263 In Azure, the trial court improperly 
permitted the prosecution’s expert to testify that “he could ‘see no reason why [the child witness] 
would not be telling the truth in this matter,’” going beyond the expert’s qualifications and 
“invad[ing] the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”264 
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that an expert could help the jury assess credibility without 
usurping its credibility-assessment function, recognizing potential expert testimony that would 
address the witness’ perception and memory or conduct, simply provide corroboration by its 
consistency with the witness’s account, or address truthful character.265 But the expert could not 
put his “stamp of believability” on the witness’ “entire story.”266 
The risk of crossing the line into improper comment on credibility is greatest when the 
expert has inside knowledge of the case or has worked closely with the witness in question.  For 
example, the jury may assume that a law enforcement officer worked on the case has inside 
knowledge and give undue weight to the testimony.267 Similarly, when an expert who has 
counseled a witness is called as an expert witness, there is a risk both that the expert will express 
belief in the witness’ account and that the jury will give undue weight to that assessment because 
of the expert’s familiarity with the witness and the case.268 When it is obvious to the jury that the 
expert possesses no special insight, the comment on credibility may be improper but it is less 
likely to require reversal.269 
263 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).  
264 801 F.2d at 339. 
265 See Azure, 801 F.2d at 340 
[B]y generally testifying about a child’s ability to separate truth from fantasy, by summarizing the medical evidence 
and expressing his opinion as to whether it was consistent the [the witness’] story that she was sexually abused, or 
perhaps by discussing various patterns of consistency in the stories of child sexual abuse victims and comparing 
those patterns with patterns in [the witness’] story. 
Id. 
266 Azure, 801 F.2d 336.  See also State v. Heath, 341 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1986) (emphasizing that prosecutor’s 
questions impermissibly elicited the expert’s assessment of whether the victim’s account of the alleged sexual 
assault was credible); State v. Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (Or. 1988) (reporting that prosecutor repeatedly asked the 
expert whether he had seen indications of deception when he interviewed the victims); Leahy, 78 P.3d 132 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2003) (reporting that prosecutor asked officer whether, based on his past experience, he had an opinion as to 
whether the victim had been abused); Patterson, 628 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (reversing conviction where 
prosecution expert testified that she did not believe the victim had made up the allegations of sexual abuse). See 
also Berger, supra note 7, at 610-11 (discussing Azure and pointing out how elusive a line the court draws). 
267 See, e.g., Scop, 846 F.2d  at 143 (expressing concern that the jurors would infer that the expert, who had 
investigated the prosecution’s case over four years, had special knowledge to which they should defer and that the 
expert himself would not differentiate between the facts proved at trial and those known to him as a result of his 
investigation). See also Nossel, supra note 26, at 245-46 
268 See, e.g., State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 958 (Fla. 1994) (finding that treating psychologist’s testimony the 
child victim was truthful constituted reversible error); Roy, 843 F.2d 305 (holding that FBI agent who investigated 
the case crossed the line into improper vouching).  See generally Berger, supra note 7, at 572-75 (discussing danger 
when investigative agent acts as expert witness). 
269 See, e.g., Greenwell, 184 F.3d at 497 (holding expert’s improper comment was harmless error); Candoli, 870 
F.2d 496.  In Smith v. State, 925 So. 2d 825, 839 (Miss. 2006) the court explained: 
The jury had the benefit of examining the videotapes with [the victims’] interviews to compare to their in-court 
testimony, thereby placing the jury in a position to draw upon their own life experiences as to the veracity of the 
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In some cases, an overreaching party tries to present an expert as a “trained observer” – 
essentially, an expert in detecting prevarication or sincerity.270 In United States v. Roy, the 
prosecution presented an FBI agent as an expert in investigating crimes and in determining the 
truthfulness of witness accounts.271 The prosecution elicited the agent’s assessment of the 
accuracy of the statements made by the defendant’s accomplices.  In doing so, the prosecution 
emphasized the consistency among those statements explaining the expert’s rationale for telling 
that the story was not concocted.272 
Overreaching may also manifest itself in a generalization concerning the truthfulness of 
certain categories of witnesses.273 For example, in People v. Bobo,274 the expert testified on 
cross-examination that “ninety-eight percent of the time when a child makes an allegation of 
sexual abuse they are telling the truth.”  The testimony necessarily rests on the assessment of the 
truthfulness of an unspecified number of witnesses in unrelated cases.  It poses several problems.  
First, there is no reliable technique for determining whether witnesses in other cases have been 
truthful.  To do so would require a method to verify claims of abuse independently and 
accurately, a method which does not exist.  Second, the generalization is far too broad to guide 
the jury’s assessment of the specific high school student on whose credibility Bobo turned.  The 
witness did not purport to distinguish among alleged abuse victims based on their age, their 
relationship to the alleged abuser, or the nature of the alleged abuse.  There was no assurance 
that the statistic cited by the witness, even if accepted, had any bearing on the testimony in the 
actual case.  Finally, it is antithetical to the jury system to invite the jury to believe a witness 
because of the probability that a witness of this type is truthful.  The use of probability to assess 
 
young girls. They could draw their own conclusions from the verbal statements and non-verbal reactions of the girls 
in the taped interviews and on the witness stand. As always, the jury has the prerogative to accept or reject, in whole 
or part, the testimony of any witness, expert or lay. 
270 See, e.g., United States v. Rosario-Diaz 202 F.3d 54, 62 & 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (reporting that FBI agent who had 
worked with the prosecution’s star witness before trial testified that he had not needed a polygraph to determine 
whether the witness was lying, explaining, “[w]e were pinning him down without a polygraph.  We could tell when 
he was lying.”); Milbradt, 756 P.2d at 626 (reporting that prosecutor asked psychologist if part of his training was to 
be a trained observer).  See also State v. Leahy, 78 P.3d 132 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (finding error where prosecutor 
elicited officer’s opinion as to whether victim had been abused based on his experience in similar cases, interview of 
the victim and contact with the defendant).  See also Simmons, supra note 7, at 1058 (suggesting that judges will not 
readily admit such expert testimony). 
271 See 843 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1988).  
272 See Roy, 843 F.2d at 307.  The court concluded that the error was harmless, relying in part on the absence of 
evidence of special training that would have given the agent “some great advantage over the jurors in divining the 
truth.” 843 F.2d at 309.  One must question this premise, given the presumptive credibility of a law enforcement 
witness combined with the explicit testimony detailing the agent’s years of investigative experience.  It seems quite 
likely that the jurors would have felt that the agent possessed a superior ability to choose between differing accounts 
of criminal events.  
273 See, e.g., Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396-97 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding trial court committed error 
by permitting witness to testify concerning the tendencies of police officers to tell the truth); Jones v. State, 606 So. 
2d 1051, 1057-58 (Miss. 1992) (holding it was error to allow expert to testify that children who have been sexually 
abused do not lie); Commonwealth v. Cepull, 568 A.2d 247, 249-50 (Pa. Super. 1990) (condemning expert’s 
testimony that studies show that “only 3 percent of all women who reported being sexually assaulted had in fact lied 
or made up a story about that”).  But see State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn.1984) (allowing expert to 
testify that children do not generally make up allegations of sexual abuse); Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138, 1139 
(Ala. 1989) (same).  See also, David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual 
Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 53-56 (1986) (criticizing similar testimony). 
274 662 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ill.App. 1996). 
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credibility suffers from the same problems that probability evidence does in other aspects of jury 
fact finding.  
Of course, the parties can avoid improper testimony by preparing their expert’s 
appropriately and avoiding questions that elicit improper endorsements of credibility.275 
However, the line between what is proper testimony and what is improper assessment of 
credibility is elusive and an expert can easily drift from proper to improper testimony.  In State v. 
Keller the Oregon Supreme Court held that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing 
the prosecution expert to testify during direct examination to her “diagnosis” of the victim in the 
child abuse case that “[t]here was no evidence of leading or coaching or fantasizing.”276 While 
she could fairly testify to what types of behavior might indicate one of these problems or to the 
risks of leading and coaching young children, the witness crossed the line into improper 
assessment of specific credibility, even testifying that the victim ‘was obviously telling you 
about what happened to her body’ and was remembering what happened.”277 
The courts and the litigants share responsibility for controlling overreaching while 
allowing expert testimony concerning credibility.  The courts must define and enforce clear rules 
permitting and delineating expert testimony that fairly assists the jury to assess witness 
credibility rather than resorting to a broad prohibition on all such testimony.  The parties 
presenting expert testimony to help the jury evaluate credibility should be clear concerning its 




The courts should evaluate expert testimony addressing credibility with more precision.   
At the same time, the court should free the discussion of such evidence from the limitation of the 
common law notion that the jury has such a special role in assessing credibility that expert 
testimony on the topic is foreclosed.  By taking these two steps, the courts will open the door to 
more expert testimony on credibility and thereby better equip jurors for their task of assessing 
credibility.  
When a party offers expert testimony that bears on credibility, the court should ask first 
whether the testimony addresses (un)truthful character and is therefore governed by Rule 608(a).  
If so, the evidence should be admitted subject to the limitations of that rule.  If the expert’s 
opinion is not limited to mere (un)truthful character, the court should determine how it informs 
the jury’s determination of credibility.  If the expert will help the jury understand the witness’s 
 
275 In State v. Folse, 623 So. 2d 59 (La. 1993), the defense attorney focused on the limits of expertise in his cross-
examination of the prosecution’s expert, asking “you can’t tell us whether she was telling the truth or not, can you” 
and eliciting the answer, “the accurate way to present it is to say that the information that the child gave is consistent 
with the dynamics of sexual abuse.” 623 So. 2d at 68. 
276 844 P.2d 195 (Or. 1993) 
277 Keller, 844 P.2d at 198.  See also United States v. Rosales, 19 F.3d 763 (1st Cir. 1994).  In Rosales, the court 
considered the testimony of an expert in a child abuse case who testified that children who have been sexually 
abused “generally ‘tend to be reluctant, they tend to be embarrassed, uncomfortable, ashamed of what happened.  
They’re very uncomfortable giving details.  I see a lot of that.  And I saw that in these children.’” 19 F.3d at 765.  
The defendant argued that the prosecution’s presentation of this testimony required reversal of his conviction.  The 
court treated the question as falling under Rule 403, which permits exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence if it 
injects undue prejudice.  The court viewed the expert’s testimony as sending “an implicit message to the jury that 
the children had testified truthfully,” and stated that “this might therefore have interfered with the jury’s function as 
the sole assessor of witness credibility.”  19 F.3d at 766.   
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perception, memory, or bias or if the expert will explain the witness’s behavior to the jury, the 
court should allow the evidence and not impose the limitations that apply to character evidence.  
Moreover, while such testimony must satisfy the usual rules governing expert testimony, it 
should not be subjected to more demanding rules.  Taking this approach, courts should admit a 
wider range of expert testimony to help the jury evaluate credibility. 
A more precise approach will better prepare the courts for future questions concerning 
evidence speaking to credibility.  The future holds the promise, or threat, that science will 
achieve ways accurately to divine a witness’ truthfulness on a specific subject or to gauge the 
strength of a witness’ perception or memory.278 This prospect may be one of reasons that courts 
have continued to rely on the maxim and restrict expert testimony bearing on credibility.  For 
example, the debate over the use of polygraph technology which has occupied the courts for 
decades reflects in part the concern that scientific assessment will supplant the jury’s role of 
assessing credibility.279 Rather than imposing blanket restrictions on expert testimony bearing 
on credibility, courts should analyze the evidence precisely and admit it where it will assist the 
jury.  
Eventually, we may face this crucial question: If reliable and viable scientific technology 
could determine whether a witness was consciously lying, would we want the fact finder to have 
that information?   More often, however, expert testimony merely plays a modest role helping 
the jurors better evaluate the credibility of specific testimony by providing insight into witness 
character, perception, memory, bias, or conduct.  It should be allowed to play that role. 
 
278 Such evidence will not be admitted until it has achieved a satisfactory level of scientific reliability.  Polygraph 
technology has achieved, or is close to achieving, that level.  See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1037-39 (discussing 
polygraph science). Other scientific methods that may prove useful, such as MRI technology, are still being 
developed.  See Jeffrey Kluger & Coco Masters, How to Spot a Liar, TIME, Aug. 20, 2006, at 46 (surveying recent 
developments in lie-detection and polygraph science).
279 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (plurality opinion) (asserting that exclusion of polygraph 
evidence protects role of trial fact finder, citing Barnard).  See generally Simmons, Conquering the Province of the 
Jury at 1039-46 (discussing admissibility of polygraph evidence); Charles W. Daniels, Using Polygraph Evidence 
After Scheffer, 27-May CHAMPION 12 (2003) (discussing admissibility of polygraph evidence and considering 
function of jury as basis for exclusion).  Courts continue to be reluctant to admit polygraph evidence even though its 
reliability has been established and is accepted outside the courtroom.  See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1043.  Perhaps 
polygraph evidence would be more acceptable to the courts if they viewed it not as a naked assessment of a witness’ 
credibility but view it instead as offering the jury insight into the witness’ consciousness of guilt or knowledge of 
certain relevant facts.  See Simmons, supra note 7, at 1038-39 (suggesting that polygraph provides state of mind 
evidence rather than an assessment of credibility). 
